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SECOND-BITE LAWMAKING*
REBECCA AVIEL**
Lawmakers can be quite persistent as they battle to advance their favored
agendas, even after unsuccessfully defending against constitutional challenge.
When a law is struck down because it is constitutionally defective, the architects
of the defeated law frequently go back to the drawing board and try again,
making modifications they hope will allow the new version to survive another
round of litigation. Sometimes this second bite at the lawmaking apple looks like
the very embodiment of good faith interbranch dialogue. But sometimes these
repeated efforts reflect the deliberate evasion of constitutional duty across
multiple cycles of lawmaking and litigation—or as Justice Kagan recently put it,
the “pouring of old poison into new bottles.” To distinguish between these two
different types of official persistence, we must first understand second-bite
lawmaking as a pervasive and trans-substantive phenomenon—one that calls
for an adjudicative framework well suited to its unique features.
This Article is the first to serve that purpose, offering three case studies in the
areas of voting rights, free speech, and religious liberty. The case studies
demonstrate that as government defendants repeatedly try to produce a law that
will withstand judicial review, they learn how to conceal the defects that were
fatal to prior versions. Courts will thus eventually be presented with laws that
have been scrubbed clean of their predecessors’ most obvious flaws. When
examining these sanitized versions, how should courts weigh the failed attempts
at constitutionally legitimate lawmaking that preceded them? This Article
considers what guidance the Supreme Court has offered on this question.
Carefully examining cases in which the Court has expressly considered the
appropriate implications to draw from prior iterations of a challenged law, this
Article reveals that over time, the Supreme Court has abandoned what was
once a tolerably sensible approach to second-bite lawmaking. The Court’s latest
pronouncement threatens to eviscerate the substantive constitutional principles
at stake in these multiphasal disputes.

* © 2022 Rebecca Aviel.
** Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like to
thank the organizers and participants of the 2021 National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars,
as well as her colleagues at the University of Denver for valuable feedback. Braxton James provided
exceptional research assistance.

100 N.C. L. REV. 947 (2022)

948

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 948
I.
BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: SECOND-BITE
LAWMAKING AS A TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE PHENOMENON ..... 955
A. Case Studies in Successive Lawmaking ............................... 955
1. Voting Rights as the Paradigm Example .................... 955
2. Ag-Gag Laws in Iowa ............................................... 964
3. President Trump’s “Muslim Ban” .............................. 973
B. Lessons and Implications ................................................... 977
II.
COMPETING APPROACHES TO SECOND-BITE LAWMAKING . 979
A. Arlington Heights as Origin Point ................................... 980
B. United States v. Fordice: Current Practices Are Traceable.. 982
C. McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky: Reasonable
Observers Have Reasonable Memories................................. 986
D. Abbott v. Perez: The Presumption of Legislative Good Faith
Is Renewable ................................................................... 991
E. Abbott Applied and Gone Astray ...................................... 996
III. REFINING THE THEORY OF SUCCESSIVE LAWMAKING ....... 1001
A. What Cuts the Thread Between Old and New? ...................1002
1. New Legislature, Clean Slate? ..................................1002
2. Passage of Time .......................................................1004
B. Is Second-Bite Lawmaking Inherently Bad? .......................1006
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1012
INTRODUCTION
“Here we go again,” lamented a district court judge in the opening words
of an order enjoining Mississippi’s latest attempt to ban abortion prior to fetal
viability.1 As the judge explained, the previability ban clearly violated the
constitutional principles governing abortion regulation, as did Mississippi’s
previous ban.2 With obvious frustration, the judge noted that “[t]he parties have
been here before,”3 and that it had been merely a year since the plaintiffs had
successfully challenged Mississippi’s prior attempt at a ban.4 Another district
court judge, patience wearing thin upon becoming the fifth federal court to rule
against the same set of asylum restrictions from the Trump administration,
1. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 549, 551 (S.D. Miss. 2019), aff’d,
951 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2020).
2. Id. at 552–53, 552 n.13 (“[W]e now use ‘viability’ as the relevant point at which a State may
begin limiting women’s access to abortion for reasons unrelated to maternal health.” (quoting Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2320 (2016))).
3. See id. at 551.
4. See id. at 552 (“This Court previously found the 15-week ban to be an unconstitutional
violation of substantive due process because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that women have
the right to choose an abortion prior to viability, and a fetus is not viable at 15 weeks . . . .”).
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observed in exasperation that “the government keeps crashing the same car into
a gate, hoping that someday it might break through.”5
As these and other examples illustrate, government defendants can be
quite persistent in pursuing their favored agendas, even after unsuccessfully
defending against a constitutional challenge. When a court strikes down a law
because it is constitutionally defective, the government officials backing the
defeated law frequently try again with a new version, enacting modified
legislation or issuing a revised executive order with the goal of preventing or
surviving another round of litigation. This pattern of persistence raises
important questions for subsequent assessments of a revised law’s
constitutionality. How many unfettered chances should lawmakers get to pass
a law after the first effort was deemed unconstitutional? Should the slate wipe
clean every time? These questions are worth sustained scholarly attention—and
not only because federal judges are growing weary.6 As this Article shows, a
convincing and consistent approach to this phenomenon—a pattern that I label
second-bite lawmaking—is essential to the operation of tiered scrutiny, intent
inquiries, and other doctrines that form the functional machinery of
constitutional adjudication.
To be sure, subsequent lawmaking can sometimes look like the very
embodiment of good faith interbranch constitutional dialogue—the system
working exactly as it should. After the Washington D.C. handgun ordinance
was struck down in District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I),7 for example, the city
went back to the drawing board and tried again, enacting a new scheme which
was again subjected to Second Amendment challenge.8 While some portions of
the new scheme were also struck down, much of it was upheld,9 reflecting the
city’s partial success in recalibrating its regulations to comply with the demands
of the Second Amendment. That the resulting regulatory landscape is
disappointing to those on both sides of the gun control divide underscores the
5. Suman Naishadham, US Judge Blocks Trump Administration’s Sweeping Asylum Rules, AP NEWS
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-immigration-courts-local-governments-3d6
ab9e79153e67d974cee1bf592862f [https://perma.cc/MSQ7-CCUF (staff-uploaded archive)]; see also
Maria Dinzeo, Judge Slams Feds over Insistence Wolf Is Lawful Homeland Security Chief, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-slams-feds-over-insistence-wolfis-lawful-homeland-security-chief/ [https://perma.cc/NJU4-HEJE] (reporting that the judge also
opined that “[t]he government keeps running the same 8-track tape and the sound is not getting
better”).
6. See Carter Sherman, “Here We Go Again:” This Judge Blocked Another Mississippi Abortion Ban
and He’s Tired, VICE NEWS (May 24, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/vb9zna/herewe-go-again-this-judge-blocked-another-mississippi-abortion-ban-and-hes-tired [https://perma.cc/C2
W8-V4MP].
7. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
8. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
9. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 801 F.3d 264, 290 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson,
J., dissenting).
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sense of disputation, dialogue, and accommodation that should characterize the
resolution of intensely contested issues in a constitutional system.10
Sometimes, however, a lawmaker’s return to the drawing board looks like
recalcitrance or outright resistance—like the persistent evasion of constitutional
duty across multiple cycles of lawmaking and litigation. The paradigm example
of iterative lawmaking that cannot be characterized as simply the boisterous
back-and-forth of interbranch constitutional dialogue is one with deep historical
roots: the unyielding but ever adaptive efforts of state officials to prevent Black
communities from voting, switching from one stratagem to another as each was
successfully challenged in court.11 While the cycle was arrested with the passage
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, described by scholars as the most successful
civil rights statute in American history,12 race-based voter suppression is hardly
a thing of the past.13
North Carolina’s recent voting laws are but one prominent example. Since
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 up to the very present moment,
there has been only a seven-week period, in the summer of 2013, during which
North Carolina was neither required to obtain federal preclearance for changes
to its voting laws nor defending its voting enactments against charges of racial
discrimination.14 It was hard at work during those seven weeks, however. The
10. See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right
To Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1438 (2018) (“Second Amendment scholarship
and commentary are particularly riven with fundamental disagreements, some of which are insoluble.”).
11. For expanded discussion of this chronology in the caselaw, see, for example, Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2351 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing how states
and localities were constantly contriving new rules to keep minority voters from the polls, thereby
“pour[ing] old poison into new bottles”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309–11 (1966)
(describing “the variety and persistence” of such laws). For scholarly discussion, see, for example, Katie
R. Eyer, The New Jim Crow Is the Old Jim Crow, 128 YALE L.J. 1002, 1033 (2019) [hereinafter Eyer, The
New Jim Crow] (“[I]n the voting domain, most of the infamous efforts to disenfranchise African
Americans—such as the grandfather clause, the poll tax, literacy tests, and felon disenfranchisement
laws—were ‘race neutral’ in design, precisely in order to evade prohibitions on facially race-based
voting restrictions.”); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 177 (2007) (“[C]ase-by-case adjudication of voting rights lawsuits proved incapable of reining
in crafty Dixiecrat legislatures determined to deprive African Americans of their right to vote,
regardless of what a federal court might order.”).
12. On the extraordinary success of the Voting Rights Act in combating race-based voter
suppression, see, for example, Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2144 (2015) (“Widely lauded
as one of the most effective statutes ever enacted, the Voting Rights Act . . . finally made good on the
promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.”).
13. See Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room: Intentional Voter
Suppression, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 214 (“[S]tates across the country [have recently] adopt[ed] a wide
range of measures making it harder to vote.”).
14. “Covered jurisdictions” included states and localities with a history of race-based voter
suppression as defined by a formula set forth in the Voting Rights Act. Voting Rights Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10313). Such
jurisdictions were required to receive preclearance from either the Attorney General or the U.S.
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North Carolina General Assembly, upon being released from its preclearance
obligations in June 2013 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v.
Holder,15 enacted an omnibus bill with a range of voting restrictions that
“target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical precision.”16 Immediately
after the law was struck down, North Carolina officials started “calling for a new
law that would incorporate some of the same ideas in a manner that they
thought could withstand judicial review.”17 The second effort, enacted in 2018,
reflected enough of those “same ideas” to suffer the same fate as the first: it was
promptly challenged in federal court and enjoined for its ongoing
discriminatory intent and disparate impact.18 Undaunted, North Carolina
legislators passed a third version in June 2020, this time bundling it with
COVID-inspired provisions, such as expanded voting by mail.19
When do these subsequent bites at the lawmaking apple seem legitimate,
and when do they seem suspect? Once our suspicions are aroused, how should
the resulting analysis proceed? Should we be content to stay within the “four
corners” of the latest iteration, ignoring the failed attempts at constitutionally
legitimate lawmaking that preceded it?20 As this Article shows, such questions
are ubiquitous, arising across multiple areas of law and implicating legislative
District Court for the District of Columbia prior to making any changes in voting procedure. § 5, 79
Stat. at 439. Forty North Carolina counties were covered jurisdictions, Billy Ball, In N.C., 40 Counties
Are No Longer Governed by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, INDY WK. (July 3, 2013, 4:00 AM),
https://indyweek.com/news/northcarolina/n.c.-40-counties-longer-governed-section-5-voting-rightsact/ [https://perma.cc/5ZL6-RA9B], until, in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), the Supreme
Court invalidated the coverage formula on the grounds that it had become outdated “in light of current
conditions.” Id. at 550–51. The Supreme Court handed down its Shelby County decision on June 25,
2013. Exactly seven weeks later, two lawsuits were filed to challenge the General Assembly’s recently
enacted voter identification bill. See Ethan Rosenberg, Two Lawsuits Challenge NC Voter ID Law, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 13, 2013, 4:49 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/
2013/08/13/two-lawsuits-challenge-nc-voter-id-law [https://perma.cc/2CMU-PDY4 (staff-uploaded
archive)].
15. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
16. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). For further
detail, see infra Section I.A.1, which relays how Republican leaders requested and received racial data
for a variety of voting practices and drafted the restrictions only after learning that African Americans
would be the voters most significantly affected.
17. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 26 (M.D.N.C. 2019), rev’d
sub nom. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2020).
18. Id. at 47 (explaining that the chronology leading up to the 2018 law “reflects an effort by the
majority party to do as little as possible and still withstand judicial review”). As explored in more detail
later in this Article, the preliminary injunction was reversed by the Fourth Circuit in December 2020.
See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
19. See David Hawkings, N.C. Legislators Clear Bill Combining Easier Mail Balloting with Voter ID,
FULCRUM (June 12, 2020), https://thefulcrum.us/north-carolina-voter-id-law [https://perma.cc/WK9
X-S4AB].
20. See, e.g., Emma Kaufman, The New Legal Liberalism, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 209–10 (2019)
(describing the majority in Trump v. Hawaii as having “reasoned that courts ought not peer beyond the
four corners of executive orders on immigration, no matter how compelling the evidence of
discriminatory intent”).
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and executive actors at both the state and federal level. As one appellate court
put it, “The outcome hinges on the answer to a simple question: How much
does the past matter?”21 But we might rephrase the question to inquire instead:
How do we know when the past is really past?22 Once attuned to this question,
we see it emerge across multiple areas of concern, including voting rights,
immigration, abortion, criminal procedure, and a host of other salient and
politically charged realms.23 What is needed, and what is provided here for the
first time in the scholarly literature, is a trans-substantive account of the
phenomenon and a systematic examination of the Supreme Court’s practices
regarding successive lawmaking.24
Part I introduces second-bite lawmaking, using detailed examples drawn
from different types of government action to illustrate the benefit of thinking
about this as a trans-substantive phenomenon. This part offers three case
studies in the areas of voting rights, free speech, and religious liberty, all of
which concern successive lawmaking and the appropriate inferences to be drawn
from prior iterations of a challenged law. The first case study offers a closer
look at North Carolina’s indefatigable attempts to make it harder to vote—
especially for Black communities.25 The second case study examines a similarly
persistent, multiphased effort by Iowa lawmakers to insulate the state’s
agricultural industry from critical coverage in the media. After each of these
“ag-gag” laws were invalidated for the impermissible burdens they placed on
protected speech, lawmakers returned to the drawing board, producing a more
tailored version that appeared responsive to the prior rulings.26 The third case
study considers President Trump’s infamous “Muslim ban,” which was
challenged, rescinded, redrafted, and then challenged and rescinded again, all
21. Raymond, 981 F.3d at 298. This seemingly straightforward formulation in fact begs the
question: Is the discrimination with which we have been concerned past or present—ongoing or
completed?
22. Acknowledgement is due here, of course, to William Faulkner, who famously observed, “The
past is never dead. It’s not even past.” WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
23. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (tracing Oregon’s rule permitting
nonunanimous verdicts to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and other efforts to dilute the influence of
minorities in Oregon juries).
24. As Professor W. Kerrel Murray observes, scholars have grappled in various ways with “the
broad idea that problematic history could affect present-day analysis.” W. Kerrel Murray,
Discriminatory Taint, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1195, 1227 (2022) (collecting sources and developing a
“temporally maximalist, institutionally realist” model for detecting when a policy bears a tainted
relationship to a discriminatory predecessor). This Article contributes to that literature by focusing on
the distinctive questions that arise when lawmakers return to the drawing board after suffering defeat
in litigation and repeatedly try either to fix or conceal the defects that were fatal to prior versions. To
that end, this Article offers three case studies in which it is possible to discern a singular trajectory of
lawmaking effort across multiple rounds of invalidation and revision. Doing so allows us to trace the
information-forcing effect of each round of judicial review and see how it redounds to the benefit of
government defendants determined to hew as closely as possible to their original course.
25. See infra Section I.A.1.
26. See infra Section I.A.2.
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before arriving at a final version that purported to emphasize the targeted
countries’ inadequate security protocols rather than religion.27
The substantive doctrinal principles at stake in each context differ
considerably, as does the relationship between the lawmaker in question and the
federal court—judicial review of presidential power in “sensitive” national
security matters is exceedingly deferential, as we are continually reminded.28
But in each of these contexts, the underlying question is, “How much does the
past matter?” Or more aptly, “How do we know the past is really past?” As this
Article shows, the answer will eventually become outcome determinative as
government defendants learn to conceal the defects that were fatal to prior
versions.
The case studies in Part I illustrate that constitutional litigation is
information forcing in a way that works to the benefit of government officials
determined to stay the course. Courts will eventually be presented with laws
that have been scrubbed clean of their most obvious flaws—sanitized versions
that might very well have passed muster had they been the lawmaker’s first
attempt at the issues in question.29 But shouldn’t the analysis of the latest
version take into account the entire sequence that preceded it? After all, in equal
protection, free speech, and religious liberty adjudication, the presence of
invidious intent is a determining factor in assessing the constitutionality of
government action.30 Are we to imagine that an impermissible purpose simply
vanishes after lawmakers learn the hard way that their work product will not
survive constitutional scrutiny?31
27. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–05 (2018).
28. Id. at 2422.
29. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 65
(2020) (describing “animus laundering” as “the ability of a government actor to change the rationale
for a government action from a discriminatory one to something more palatable to satisfy further
judicial review”); see also Joshua Matz, Thoughts on the Chief’s Strategy in the Census Case, TAKE CARE
(July 1, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/thoughts-on-the-chief-s-strategy-in-the-census-case
[https://perma.cc/DZH3-JH2B] (explaining that, in some cases, courts themselves “order[] a round of
revision,” giving legislators opportunities “in which the most blatant lies will be washed away and
replaced with subtler lies”).
30. Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2018)
(“‘Discriminatory intent’ is a central term in the judicial interpretation of constitutional clauses
requiring the equal treatment of persons without regard to their race, ethnicity, or religion.”).
31. Any work that involves discussion of legislative intent, purpose, or motive must contend with
a formidable set of caveats and complications. As Professor Richard Fallon, Jr., has queried, “When the
Supreme Court invokes the concepts of legislative intent or purpose, and occasionally of legislative
motivation, does it refer—possibly confusedly or even incoherently—to an imagined collective mental
state, to some aggregation of the mental states of individual legislators, or to something else?” Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 527 (2016). A rich
scholarly literature explores these and other intent-related questions in detail. For a nonexhaustive list,
see, for example, John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970) (“The Supreme Court’s traditional confusion about the relevance of legislative
and administrative motivation in determining the constitutionality of governmental actions has, over
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Part II considers what guidance the Supreme Court has offered on this
question. At a high enough level of abstraction, there is no doubt that a
challenged law’s full trajectory can be considered—after all, the Court said as
much in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp.,32 setting
forth what is now a well-established framework for plaintiffs challenging
unconstitutional conduct. But as usual, the devil is in the details. As we start to
probe more deeply into the methodological questions surrounding successive
lawmaking, we find a considerable lack of clarity.
By carefully examining the cases in which the Court has expressly
considered the appropriate implications to draw from prior iterations of a
challenged law, Part II reveals that over time the Court has taken profoundly
divergent approaches. The Court at one point was highly sensitive to the idea
that a contemporary, facially unproblematic law might nonetheless contain
“unconstitutional remnants” if it was “traceable” to prior unconstitutional
conduct.33 The Court went so far as to place the burden on the state—having
enacted an “initially tainted policy”—to show that the link between the new law
and the prior version had been severed.34 In a subsequent case, while not
applying an explicit burden-shifting framework, the Court expressly took into
account the evolution of a challenged policy, not merely its latest iteration.35 As
the Court observed, “[T]he world is not made brand new every morning . . . .
[R]easonable observers have reasonable memories . . . .”36 More recently,
however, the Court cautioned against treating “past discrimination” as a sort of
“original sin” that continues to taint subsequent lawmaking, reversing the lower

the past few terms, achieved disaster proportions.” (footnote omitted)); Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift
and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter Eyer, Ideological
Drift] (considering whether intent inquiries have a progressive or conservative valence); Caleb Nelson,
Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1790–91 (2008) (answering the question,
“What role are courts supposed to play in enforcing purpose-based restrictions on legislative power?”);
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 239, 244 (1992) (“[T]here is not a single legislative intent, but rather many legislators’
intents.”); Timothy W. Grinswell, The Best of All Possible Congresses, NEW RAMBLER, https://new
ramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/the-best-of-all-possible-congresses [http://perma.cc/5A4D-G68
N] (reviewing The Nature of Legislative Intent by Richard Ekins and determining that Ekins “provides
a serious defense of legislative intent as integral to the lawmaking process”); see also McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To ask what interest, what
objective, legislation serves, of course, is not to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine the
necessary effects of what they have enacted.”). For an argument that the inquiry should be described
instead as one that focuses on “legislative context,” see VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW,
MISREADING DEMOCRACY 135–37 (2016).
32. 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (identifying, “without purporting to be exhaustive, subjects of
proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed”).
33. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 733–34 (1992).
34. Id. at 746–47 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005).
36. Id.
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court for disregarding “the presumption of legislative good faith.”37 Part II
explains why this latest pronouncement has destabilized what had been a
sensible approach to successive lawmaking. An infinitely renewable
presumption of good faith that refreshes in full, no matter how many times
lawmakers have returned to the drawing board, will eviscerate the substantive
principles at stake in these multiphasal disputes.
Part III tackles additional questions that emerge as we develop and refine
a theory of second-bite lawmaking. Would reenactment by a newly constituted
legislature be sufficient to cut the thread between a new attempt and prior
invalidated versions? Could the mere passage of time, at least when combined
with extensive social transformation, be enough to cleanse a law of a prior
improper purpose? Under what conditions might we conclude that lawmakers
going back to the drawing board are sincerely engaged in good faith interbranch
dialogue, recalibrating their policy preferences to accommodate constitutional
principles? Following an exploration of these questions and synthesizing the
key lessons of second-bite lawmaking, this Article concludes that an adequate
framework for evaluating patterns of official persistence requires procedural
mechanisms tailored to this unique context.
I. BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: SECOND-BITE LAWMAKING AS A
TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE PHENOMENON
This part explores three different case studies in successive lawmaking,
beginning with one that is regrettably familiar: race-based voter suppression. It
then considers the phenomenon in a newer area of constitutional struggle, the
battles over speech-suppressing “ag-gag” laws, before turning to the highprofile controversy over President Trump’s multiple efforts to impose a Muslim
ban. As we see in each of these contexts, every subsequent law was inextricably
linked to its predecessor, revealing a singular trajectory of lawmaking effort.
A.

Case Studies in Successive Lawmaking
1.

Voting Rights as the Paradigm Example

History shows that we may fail to understand the full import of official
action if we simply look at each challenged law as a discrete and independent
constitutional battle. Nearly one hundred years after the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court characterized the efforts of state
officials to prevent Black voters from exercising the franchise as nothing other
than “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”38 Against the
37. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018) (“[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner
of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful.” (quoting City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980))).
38. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966).
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“clear commands” of the Fifteenth Amendment, states like Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia
repeatedly created new voter suppression mechanisms in order to evade court
orders striking down their earlier efforts.39 They enacted literacy tests, for
example, which were “specifically designed” to prevent Black citizens from
voting.40 A typical test required registrants to read and write, while exempting
from the literacy requirement the “lineal descendants” of those who had been
eligible to vote in 1866—a category comprised entirely of white people.41
When Oklahoma’s version of this “grandfather clause” was struck down
by the Court in 1915, the state responded with a law providing that (1) all those
who had been eligible to vote in 1914 remained eligible to vote; and (2) everyone
else would need to register between April 30, 1916, and May 11, 1916, or else
permanently lose the right to register and vote.42 This obvious attempt to achieve
the same exclusionary effect as the invalidated grandfather clause was also
struck down,43 as were all-white primaries,44 racial gerrymandering efforts,45 and
the discriminatory application of voting tests.46
Notwithstanding this impressive record of federal court victories, it
became clear that repeatedly bringing suit under the Fifteenth Amendment was
ultimately ineffective against “the variety and persistence” of mechanisms
designed to deprive Black voters of their rights.47 Decades of successful
litigation were insufficient to correct this intransigence, in spite of the clear
constitutional command, because voting suits were onerous to prepare,
litigation was slow, and even when victory was finally achieved, states “merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees or . . .
enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity.”48 This
was the phenomenon that Congress sought to arrest with the preclearance
mechanism of the Voting Rights Act, requiring states with a history of racially
39. Id. at 309–10.
40. Id. at 310.
41. Id. at 310–11. These so-called “grandfather clauses” were struck down by the Supreme Court
in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 347, 364–65 (1915), and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 369,
379–80 (1915). For additional discussion of voter suppression tactics during this period, see Guy-Uriel
E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Slouching Toward Universality: A Brief History of Race, Voting,
and Political Participation, 62 HOW. L.J. 809, 832 (2019).
42. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 270–71 (1939).
43. Id. at 277.
44. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664–66
(1944).
45. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960).
46. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1965); Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S.
37, 37 (1962) (per curiam); Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933, 933 (1949) (per curiam).
47. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311–12, 334–35 (1966) (describing the
“extraordinary stratagem[s] of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees”).
48. Id. at 314.
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discriminatory voting practices to demonstrate that any proposed change to
voting procedure would not diminish the ability of any citizen to vote on
account of race or color. Indeed, “Section 5 was a response to a common practice
in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing
new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down.”49
The particular legal question at issue in South Carolina v. Katzenbach50 was
whether this pronounced pattern of persistence provided a sufficient foundation
for Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act,51 but the lesson we can draw is
much broader. As egregious as they are in isolation, neither the twelve-day
registration period,52 the twenty-eight-sided voting district,53 nor any of the
other voter suppression stratagems invalidated by the Court can convey how
“unremitting and ingenious” was the determination to prevent Black citizens
from voting.54 Only by viewing all of these efforts as iterations in the same
ongoing struggle can we truly understand the significance of each of these laws
and the “insidious and pervasive evil” that animated their enactment.55 This
lesson has been clearly understood for quite some time with regards to the
conditions that led to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, forming a settled
narrative in the case law and the scholarly literature devoted to this pivotal era.
We must now consider the potential for its continued application.
When we heed the call to evaluate official action across time, and perhaps
across jurisdictions, where else do we see “unremitting and ingenious defiance”56
or such “variety and persistence”?57 Notably, we still see it with racially
discriminatory burdens on voting, and a careful examination of current voter
suppression efforts will illuminate some of the key issues in second-bite
lawmaking.
North Carolina, for example, suffers from a “long and shameful history of
race-based voter suppression,” and is in the midst of a profoundly contentious
dispute about whether such discrimination is better described as past or
present.58 From 1965 until the summer of 2013, forty North Carolina counties
were covered jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act, which required them
to obtain preclearance from the federal government before enacting any laws

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976).
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Id. at 308.
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 271 (1939).
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 311.
See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 311 (4th Cir. 2020).

100 N.C. L. REV. 947 (2022)

958

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

pertaining to voting.59 In 2013, within seven weeks of being freed from the
preclearance obligation by the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby County v.
Holder,60 North Carolina enacted an omnibus law with multiple types of
“punishing” restrictions on voting.61 Challengers filed suit hours after the bill
was signed into law,62 initiating a string of legal battles that are still pending in
some form as of spring 2022.63
While Shelby County was a pivotal moment in this chronology, North
Carolina’s General Assembly had been working to enact a voter identification
bill even before being freed of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance regime.64
Its first effort passed both chambers65 but was vetoed by Governor Beverly
Perdue in 2011, who explained that the bill would “unnecessarily and unfairly
disenfranchise many eligible and legitimate voters.”66 Perhaps inattentive to the
risk of confirming and indeed strengthening this assessment,67 the General
Assembly returned to the drawing board and at multiple points in 2012 and
59. Id. at 298. For a complete list of North Carolina’s covered counties, see Jurisdictions Previously
Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T JUST., Error! Hyperlink reference not
valid.https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://perma.cc/PVJ957N5] (Nov. 29, 2021).
60. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
61. Voter Information Verification Act, ch. 381, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1505 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.); see also Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry
and Constitutional Rights, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2147, 2162–63 (2019); Eyer, The New Jim Crow, supra
note 11, at 1040–41 (describing the law as a “new ‘colorblind’ form[] of racial subordination” that
continues to exclude African Americans from political participation rights).
62. See Rosenberg, supra note 14.
63. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Berger, 999 F.3d 915, 923 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 142 S. Ct. 577 (2021) (mem.) (explaining that the district court trial on the merits was
postponed pending the resolution of a separate appeal regarding intervention). In November 2021, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the intervention question. See Berger, 142 S. Ct. at 577. The
district court stayed the entire case, including the trial that had been scheduled to begin January 24,
2022, pending the resolution of the certiorari grant. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper,
No. 18CV01034, 2021 WL 3639493, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2021); see also Will Doran, Voter ID Is
Blocked for Now in NC. Your Guide to All the Court Fights and What’s Next, NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept.
19, 2021, 11:17 AM), https://www.newsobserver.com/article254326153.html [https://perma.cc/8DCSX67Y (staff-uploaded, dark archive)].
64. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 2020).
65. H.B. 351, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011).
66. Ned Barnett, North Carolina Governor Vetoes Voter Photo ID Bill, REUTERS (June 23, 2011,
4:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-voterid-northcarolina/north-carolina-governor-vetoesvoter-photo-id-bill-idUSTRE75M7LM20110623 [https://perma.cc/9N2U-JUDG]. Governor Perdue
alluded to North Carolina’s Jim Crow past, stating, “There was a time in North Carolina history when
the right to vote was enjoyed only by some citizens rather than by all. That time is past, and we should
not revisit it.” Eric Kleefeld, North Carolina Dem Governor Vetoes GOP Voter-ID Bill, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (June 23, 2011, 1:48 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/north-carolina-demgovernor-vetoes-gop-voter-id-bill [https://perma.cc/F979-DMY7 (dark archive)].
67. State Republicans driving these efforts were no doubt emboldened by having won the
governorship and supermajorities in both state chambers in 2012. See Mary C. Curtis, A Voter ID Battle
in North Carolina, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-peop
le/wp/2013/03/13/a-voter-id-battle-in-north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/Z5SV-TDZE (dark archive)].
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2013 requested and received information on the racial demographics of voter
identification, as well as practices such as early and provisional voting.68 The
record makes clear that the legislators wanted to know which racial groups used
which types of identification and voting practices, and that they were successful
in obtaining this information. Representative Harry Warren, a sponsor of the
pending voter ID bill, requested that the State Board of Elections provide “a
cross-matching of registered voters who have ‘neither a NC Driver’s License
nor a NC Identification Card’ and the ‘number of one-stop voters and
provisional voters.’”69 He further requested that both inquiries be “broken down
by all possible demographics” collected by the State Board of Elections,
including “party affiliation, ethnicity, age, gender, etc.”70 The director of the
State Board of Elections provided Representative Warren with a link where the
requested data could be found, including “summary counts based on different
demographics.”71 Representative David Lewis, another sponsor, received “a
spreadsheet that contained race data for individual same-day registrants and
whether those registrants were verified.”72 A legislative research staffer sought
and obtained “a breakdown of the 2008 voter turnout, by race (white and black)
and type of vote (early and election day).”73
As the General Assembly was gathering and contemplating this and other
related data, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Shelby County, releasing
North Carolina from the obligation to obtain federal preclearance of changes to
its voting laws.74 The very next day, the Republican chairman of the Senate
Rules Committee announced that in lieu of the single-issue voter identification
bill that had been winding its way through the legislative process, the Assembly
would soon “have an omnibus bill coming out.”75
The bill was then revised and expanded in a number of ways. With regards
to the original issue of voter identification, “[t]he pre-Shelby County version of
[the bill] provided that all government-issued IDs, even many that had been
expired, would satisfy the requirement.”76 The post-Shelby County version was
amended to exclude many of the alternative types of identification typically
used by Black voters, retaining as acceptable only the types of ID that “white

68. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2016).
69. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 489–90 (M.D.N.C.),
rev’d and remanded, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). “One-stop voters” refer to those availing themselves
of a “procedure allowing voters to request and cast an absentee ballot at the same time.” Id. at 332 n.4.
70. Id. at 490.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 489.
74. Id. at 498; see also Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
75. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 498.
76. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir. 2016); H.B. 351,
2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011).
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North Carolinians were more likely to possess.”77 The bill was also expanded to
include a reduction of the early voting period; the elimination of same-day
registration; restrictions on provisional voting, including the use of out-ofprecinct ballots; and the elimination of “pre-registration” of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds who would not be eighteen by the next general election.78
The racial data requested and received by the General Assembly showed that
each of the eliminated or restricted practices were disproportionately used by
Black voters.79 This omnibus bill passed both houses, was signed into law by the
governor, and was challenged immediately in federal court as a violation of the
Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.80
The district court entered judgment against the plaintiffs,81 and the Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that the challenged provisions were enacted with
racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.82 In May 2017,
the Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for certiorari, leaving in place
the appellate court’s ruling against the discriminatory provisions.83 Within
hours of that denial, legislators began “calling for a new law that would
incorporate some of the same ideas in a manner that they thought could
withstand judicial review.”84 By the end of 2018, the General Assembly had
enacted another voter identification law over Governor Roy Cooper’s veto.85
77. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216; H.B. 589, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013).
78. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 340. Additional measures included:
(4) the allowance for up to ten at-large poll observers within each county; (5) the ability of
any registered voter in the county, as opposed to precinct, to challenge a ballot; (6) the
elimination of the discretion of [county boards of elections] to keep the polls open an
additional hour on Election Day in “extraordinary circumstances.”
Id.
79. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216–17.
80. Id. at 218. Another group of plaintiffs challenged the age restrictions as violations of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Id.
81. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
82. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219, 242.
83. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1399 (2017) (mem.).
84. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 26 (M.D.N.C. 2019), rev’d
sub nom. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2020).
85. Id. at 27. Republicans were able to use their supermajorities in the state legislature to place a
constitutional amendment on the 2018 ballot that would require photo ID for voting. Id. (citing Act of
June 29, 2018, ch. 128, 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws 824). The amendment, which was adopted by popular
vote in November 2018, instructed the legislature to enact laws setting forth the specific requirements.
Id. The legislature did so in December 2018, producing the modified voter ID law that was again subject
to challenge. Id. Governor Cooper’s veto message expressed his view that the measure “was designed
to suppress the rights of minority, poor and elderly voters” and would “trap honest voters in confusion
and discourage them with new rules.” Id. (quoting Governor Roy Cooper, Objections and Veto
Message on S.B. 824 (Dec. 14, 2018), https://webservices.ncleg.gov/ViewBillDocument/2017/7703/0/
S824-BD-NBC-2666 [https://perma.cc/D64A-HKZK]). The 2018 bill included a wider array of
acceptable forms of ID, but set forth a list that “continues to primarily include IDs which minority
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The following day, plaintiffs filed suit challenging the 2018 law and
requesting a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part.86
The preceding history concerning the 2013 omnibus law figured prominently
in the district court’s opinion—not because there was any lingering controversy
regarding the now-defunct provisions of the 2013 law, but because the court
found the chronology to be relevant in assessing the intent motivating the 2018
law.87 The state defendants appealed the preliminary injunction,88 and while the
appeal was pending, the General Assembly passed yet another voting bill in
June 2020.89
The June 2020 bill was originally presented and debated as a suite of
measures to address the challenges of administering an election safely during
the COVID-19 pandemic.90 To that end, the bill provided funding for election
officials to sanitize polling stations and purchase protective equipment for poll
workers, allowed greater flexibility in the staffing of polling stations, reduced
the number of witnesses needed for absentee ballots from two to one, and
offered an online mechanism for requesting an absentee ballot.91 But while the
bill was pending, Republican legislators92 added language that would allow
voters to present public assistance documents as proof of identification if the
voters disproportionately lack, and leaves out those which minority voters are more likely to have.” Id.
at 38. It added an expanded procedure for claiming reasonable impediment to the presentation of photo
ID, and it included absentee voting, which is disproportionately used by white voters and had been
exempted from the 2013 ID requirement. See id. at 34–36.
86. See id. at 24, 54. Methodically working through the factors set out in Arlington Heights for the
assessment of facially neutral laws that are alleged to be motivated by discriminatory intent—including
the historical background and legislative history of the challenged law—the district court found that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the 2018 law was motivated by racially
discriminatory intent. See id. at 43.
87. See id. at 25 (“[T]o fully understand and contextualize S.B. 824, its mechanics, its proposed
implementation, and the motivations of those who enacted it, a brief review of that history is necessary
here.”).
88. Raymond, 981 F.3d at 301.
89. See Hawkings, supra note 19; see also Bipartisan Elections Act of 2020, ch. 17, 2020 N.C. Sess.
Laws 104 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 163).
90. Melissa Boughton, With State Elections Bill Sleight of Hand, GOP Seeks To Revive Enjoined Voter
ID Law, NC POL’Y WATCH (June 11, 2020), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2020/06/11/with-stateelections-bill-sleight-of-hand-gop-seeks-to-revive-enjoined-voter-id-law/ [https://perma.cc/K9GL-W
EZF].
91. WILLIAM JANOVER, KYRA JASPER, CAMPBELL JENKINS, CHRISTOPHER MIDDLETON,
MEGHA PARWANI, SANDY PECHT, GEORGIA ROSENBERG & INDY SOBOL, STANFORD-MIT
HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT, NORTH CAROLINA’S 2020 ELECTION PREPARATIONS 5–6 (2020),
https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/NC_preparations.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2AS
-QHJJ].
92. For a discussion of the difficulty in “distinguishing government actions motivated by race
from those motivated by partisanship,” see Joshua S. Sellers, Politics as Pretext, 62 HOW. L.J. 687, 688
(2019). Professor Richard Hasen has explored in depth “the legal problems caused by ‘conjoined
polarization’: the overlap of race and party preferences, particularly in the American South, with white
voters overwhelmingly preferring Republican candidates and African-Americans (and to a lesser extent
Latino voters) preferring Democratic candidates.” See Hasen, supra note 29, at 71.
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enjoined voter identification requirements from the 2018 law were allowed to
go into effect.93 This immensely clever strategy presented the Democratic
legislators with a multilayered dilemma. Most immediately, if they were to vote
against the bill in objection to the newly added voter identification provisions,
they risked imperiling the incontrovertibly necessary pandemic measures.94 But
they were also faced with a strategic choice about the pending litigation over
the 2018 law and how best to understand the status quo in which they found
themselves. As they debated, North Carolina Democrats and voting rights
advocates had no way to know whether, at any moment, the appellate court
might reverse the preliminary injunction against the 2018 law and resurrect the
voter identification requirement—potentially in time for the all-important
November 2020 election.95 If that were to happen, it would unquestionably be
better for Black voters to be allowed to satisfy the ID requirement with public
assistance documents.96 On the other hand, North Carolina Democrats had no
wish to sanitize and potentially rehabilitate the latest iteration of a voter
identification project with discriminatory origins.97 Legislators concerned with
voter disenfranchisement faced the prospect that in the eyes of the courts, the
addition of public assistance documents might be just enough to salvage a voter

93. See Boughton, supra note 90; see also Bryan Warner, Common Cause NC Statement on Enactment
of Bipartisan Bill To Prepare State for Elections amid COVID-19, COMMON CAUSE N.C. (June 12, 2010,
6:37 PM), https://www.commoncause.org/north-carolina/press-release/common-cause-nc-statementon-enactment-of-bipartisan-bill-to-prepare-state-for-elections-amid-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/GD7
J-VLZX] (“A controversial provision in the bill that is unrelated to COVID-19 relief—and that was
opposed by Common Cause NC and other pro-democracy groups—deals with voter ID. It is important
to note that a court injunction has blocked the implementation of voter ID requirements in North
Carolina. This bill’s provision does not supersede the court order that remains in place blocking voter
ID.”).
94. See Boughton, supra note 90. Representative Raymond Smith, Jr., one of three Black
Democrats to vote against the measure, decried as “one of the oldest tricks in the book” the Republican
effort to include a voter ID provision in a bill that has “absolutely everything to do with the health of
our people, the health of our state.” Id.
95. See Will Doran, Why a Law Responding to Coronavirus Could Also Help Republicans in a Voter ID
Lawsuit, NEWS & OBSERVER, https://www.newsobserver.com/article244122227.html [https://perma.
cc/6XT3-52TB (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] (July 10, 2020, 9:39 AM) (“Republican lawmakers are
currently appealing their losses in three different lawsuits related to voter ID.”).
96. See Michael Wines, North Carolina Court Strikes Down a Voter ID Law, Citing Racial
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/17/us/politics/northcarolina-voter-id-law.html [https://perma.cc/2NRW-24GQ (dark archive)] (“[E]ven if the photo
identification law improved on its predecessor, it still had a lopsided impact on Black voters.
Republicans rejected Democratic proposals to add public assistance and high-school ID cards to the list
of accepted identification, . . . and an expert testified that Black voters were about 39 percent more
likely to lack an accepted ID than were white voters.”).
97. Representative Smith, Jr., for example, explained his vote against the bill: “My feeling was
that by voting in favor of this bill, we were in essence introducing a new voter ID law. We just created
another window of opportunity.” Boughton, supra note 90.
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identification scheme that would otherwise suffer the same fate as its
unconstitutional predecessor.98
Ultimately, the June 2020 bill passed with bipartisan support and was
signed into law by the governor.99 The preliminary injunction against the 2018
voter ID bill stayed in place through the November 2020 election but was
reversed soon thereafter.100 Reviewing the lower court’s ruling against the 2018
voter ID law, the Fourth Circuit was troubled by the degree to which the district
court emphasized the discriminatory intent behind the invalidated 2013 law,
critiquing the district court for having treated it as “effectively dispositive of its
intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law.”101 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
preliminary injunction of the 2018 law, holding that the district court had
“improperly flipped the burden of proof” regarding the legislative purpose.102
We will return to this opinion in more detail, but we must first understand
the extent to which the dynamics revealed in this chronology appear in other
contexts. As becomes evident in the next sections, North Carolina legislators
are not alone in their commitment to stay the chosen course, responding to
unfavorable rulings by finding new vehicles for the “same ideas” that animated
their previous unsuccessful efforts.103 In the voting rights context and others,
attending carefully to these patterns of legislative persistence is essential to a
full understanding of the subsequent enactments.
In drawing this parallel between the ongoing battles over voting rights in
North Carolina and official persistence in other areas of constitutional struggle,
I do not intend to diminish the primacy of race-based voter suppression in this
country’s past, present, or future. With the nation still reeling from the January
6, 2021, terrorist attack on the Capitol—one that historians have identified as
merely the latest in a chronology of violent white political backlash stretching
back throughout the nation’s history104—it is safe to say that the appropriate
rules of electoral engagement for a multiracial democracy is the central
overriding concern of our time. But it would be a mistake to conclude that the
pattern of official persistence exemplified by North Carolina’s determination to
98. See id. (gathering statements from legislators who voted against the bill because of the newly
added voter ID provision). Tomas Lopez, the executive director of Democracy NC, referenced the
pending litigation in his critique and described the Republican addition of public assistance documents
to the 2020 bill “as an attempt by leadership at a ‘quick fix’ to North Carolina’s voter ID problem as
raised by those courts.” Id.
99. Warner, supra note 93.
100. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 310–11 (4th Cir. 2020).
101. Id. at 303.
102. Id.
103. See infra Sections I.A.2–3.
104. Rick Perlstein, acclaimed historian of the American reactionary right, explained this
phenomenon in a video released on social media shortly after the January 6 attack. See Rick Perlstein
(@attn), TWITTER (Jan. 15, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://twitter.com/attn/status/1350140696141783040
[https://perma.cc/L2E7-J949].
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pass a voter identification bill is limited to voting rights, as the next sections
illustrate. While race-based voter suppression may be sui generis in many
respects, it offers lessons about official persistence in unconstitutional conduct
that translate to many other contexts.
2. Ag-Gag Laws in Iowa
In the same month that North Carolina officials produced their third
attempt at a voter identification law, lawmakers in Iowa were showing similar
levels of determination to pass the kind of measure that has come to be known
as an “ag-gag” law. Named to convey the underlying motive to muzzle criticism
of the agricultural industry,105 ag-gag laws criminalize whistleblowing and
undercover investigations in agricultural facilities.106 Urged upon state
legislatures by the agricultural industry as a mechanism to prevent the damaging
public relations fallout from undercover investigations conducted by journalists
and activists,107 ag-gag laws have been repeatedly found unconstitutional for the
burdens they place on protected speech.108 As with the voter suppression efforts
explored above, ag-gag laws are not confined to a single state,109 and there is
much to learn by considering the controversy across state lines. Homing in on
a single state, however, helps us understand the phenomenon of second-bite
lawmaking that is the focus of this Article.

105. The term “ag-gag” was coined by New York Times food writer Mark Bittman. Mark Bittman,
Opinion, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011, 9:29 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.ny
times.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/ [https://perma.cc/P5PL-2S8T (dark archive)].
106. See An Overview of “Ag-Gag” Laws, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.
org/journals/overview-ag-gag-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9KMJ-PCPG].
107. See Justin F. Marceau, Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317, 1317–
18 (2015).
108. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1213 (D. Utah 2017); see
also Caitlin A. Ceryes & Christopher D. Heaney, “Ag-Gag” Laws: Evolution, Resurgence, and Public
Health Implications, 28 NEW SOLS. 664, 666 (2019) (providing a brief history of similar proposed and
enacted legislation across the country).
109. Alleen Brown, Iowa Quietly Passes Its Third Ag-Gag Bill After Constitutional Challenges,
INTERCEPT (June 10, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/10/iowa-animal-rights-crimeag-gag-law/ [https://perma.cc/RQM8-XZPQ] (“Iowa isn’t alone in using legislation to criminalize
animal rights activism and whistleblowing. For more than a decade, the American Legislative Exchange
Council, an organization that links industry lobbyists with state lawmakers, has promoted a model aggag bill. More than two dozen states have introduced versions of the bill, and in half a dozen states,
they remain law. In Idaho, Utah, Kansas, and Wyoming, ag-gag laws have been overturned as
unconstitutional.”).
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Iowa, the nation’s largest producer of pork110 and eggs,111 offers a useful
case study to illuminate official persistence in the realm of ag-gag laws.112 Iowa’s
first ag-gag law113 was struck down in January 2019 after a federal district court
judge ruled that the law was a content-based restriction on speech that could
not withstand strict scrutiny.114 Two months later, Iowa enacted a second
version,115 making modifications that turned out to be too minor to save the new
law from being enjoined as well; the judge remarked that the state defendants
had still “not made any persuasive record regarding the interests the statute is
said to serve.”116 Remaining undeterred, Iowa lawmakers tried yet again,
enacting a third ag-gag law in June 2020.117 As is usually the case with iterative
lawmaking, an accurate understanding of the third version requires that Iowa’s
ag-gag chronology be examined in further detail.
When lawmakers convened in 2012 to debate and enact Iowa’s first ag-gag
law, the state’s agricultural interests were experiencing an onslaught of negative
publicity on a national scale.118 Undercover investigations had exposed horrific
abuse and unsanitary conditions at several of Iowa’s industrial farms, prompting
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to initiate regulatory actions119 and
national grocery chains to suspend purchasing from the facilities shown in the
110. Iowa Pork Facts, IOWA PORK PRODUCERS ASS’N, https://www.iowapork.org/news-from-theiowa-pork-producers-association/iowa-pork-facts/ [https://perma.cc/3DCX-GPK7].
111. Did You Know that Iowa Is Number One in Egg Production in the United States?, IOWA EGG
COUNCIL, https://www.iowaegg.org/egg-industry/iowa-egg-farmers [http://perma.cc/8RFG-6QEA].
112. See Tyler Lobdell, Iowa’s Waged a War To Silence Big Ag Critics. We’re Trying To Stop Them in
Court., FOOD & WATER WATCH (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/2021/09/02/
iowas-waged-a-war-to-silence-big-ag-critics-were-trying-to-stop-them-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/C2
7V-SYK9] (“Iowa enacted its first Ag-Gag law in 2012, and has since passed three more in response to
court decisions striking down these laws for violating the First Amendment. . . . Ag-Gag 4.0 takes a
slightly different approach than previous attempts . . . .”).
113. Act of Mar. 2, 2012, 2012 Iowa Acts 5 (codified at IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2013)).
114. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds (Reynolds II), 353 F. Supp. 3d 812, 824–26 (S.D. Iowa
2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 8 F.4th 781 (8th Cir. 2021).
115. Act of Mar. 14, 2019, 2019 Iowa Acts 4 (codified at IOWA CODE § 717A.3B (2020)).
116. Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. Reynolds, No. 19-cv-00124, 2019 WL 8301668, at *20 (S.D. Iowa
Dec. 2, 2019); see also Donnelle Eller, Judge Issues Order Preventing Enforcement of Iowa’s New ‘Ag-Gag’
Law, DES MOINES REG., https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2019/12/02/
federal-judge-stops-enforcement-iowas-new-ag-gag-law/2591453001/ [http://perma.cc/VGN5-U9GA]
(Dec. 3, 2019, 4:55 PM) [hereinafter Eller, Judge Issues Order].
117. Act of June 10, 2020, 2020 Iowa Acts 62 (codified at IOWA CODE § 716.7A (2020)); see
also Ava Auen-Ryan & Emma Schmit, Iowa Leaders Use Pandemic To Restrict Free Speech on Ag
Concerns, IOWA STARTING LINE (June 22, 2020, 3:18 PM), https://iowastartingline.com/2020/06/22/
iowa-leaders-use-pandemic-to-restrict-free-speech-on-ag-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/M4G3-BV2V].
As with their colleagues in North Carolina, Iowa lawmakers used pandemic-related legislation as a
vehicle to revive their ag-gag agenda while the enjoined second iteration was pending in federal court.
Id.
118. See Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 816–17.
119. Dan Flynn, Egg Rule Violations Cost Sparboe Its McDonald’s Account, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/11/egg-rule-violations-cost-sparboe-mcdon
alds-account/ [https://perma.cc/5YK5-H2VV].Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
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video recordings.120 For the most part, the whistleblowers were animal rights
activists who had obtained employment at the facilities they were hoping to
investigate.121 They then used their access as employees to record workers
engaged in abusive conduct, such as hurling piglets at a concrete floor, beating
pigs with metal rods, and sticking clothespins into the pigs’ eyes and faces.122
Investigators at one Iowa farm “documented hens with gaping, untreated
wounds laying eggs in cramped conditions among decaying corpses.”123
As the results of these investigations were circulated in the national media,
Iowa’s lawmakers introduced a bill to create the crime of “agricultural
production facility fraud.”124 The new offense would occur when a person
willfully
a. Obtains access to an agricultural production facility by false
pretenses [, or]
b. Makes a false statement or representation as part of an application
or agreement to be employed at an agricultural production facility, if the
person knows the statement to be false, and makes the statement with an
intent to commit an act not authorized by the owner of the agricultural
production facility, knowing that the act is not authorized.125
Lawmakers described the bill as both promoting the security of
agricultural facilities and protecting the industry from reputational harm. One
state senator, commenting on a draft version of the bill, said, “What we’re
aiming at is stopping these groups that go out and gin up campaigns that they
use to raise money by trying to give the agriculture industry a bad name.”126
Another legislator explained that the goal was to “protect agriculture . . . [and]
not have any subversive acts . . . bring down an industry,” and that the law was
“passed mainly for protection of an industry that is dedicated to actually feeding
the world in the next 25 years.”127 The bill was signed into law by the Governor,
120. Anne-Marie Dorning, Iowa Pig Farm Filmed, Accused of Animal Abuse, ABC NEWS (June 29,
2011, 9:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/iowa-pig-farm-filmed-accused-animal-abuse/story?
id=13956009 [https://perma.cc/R7SH-4TDP].
121. Id.
122. Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 816–17.
123. Clark Kauffman, Iowa’s ‘Ag Gag’ Has Stifled Investigations, Despite Pending Court Challenges,
IOWA CAP. DISPATCH (Nov. 27, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://iowacapitaldispatch.com/2020/11/27/iowasag-gag-has-stifled-investigations-despite-pending-court-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/8GYJ-KZ89].
124. Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 816; see also H. File 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011).
125. Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 818; see also H. File 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011). Iowa
law already criminalized trespass and other offenses more squarely tailored to the concerns about
biosecurity, such as the “willful possession, transportation, or transfer” of pathogens. Reynolds II, 353
F. Supp. 3d at 826; see also IOWA CODE § 717A.4(1) (Westlaw through legislation from the 2021 2d
Extraordinary Sess.).
126. Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 817.
127. Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp.
3d 812 (No. 17-cv-00362).
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whose spokesperson previously told a newspaper that the Governor “believes
undercover filming is a problem that should be addressed.”128
A coalition of journalists and advocacy groups dedicated to animal welfare,
food safety, and worker protection filed suit, asserting that the law was a
viewpoint-based, content-based, and overbroad restriction on protected
speech.129 The district court agreed that the law was a content-based restriction
and that the prohibited speech, while false, was nonetheless within the domain
of First Amendment protection.130 Essential to this aspect of the ruling was that
the speech prohibited by the law required “no likelihood of actual, tangible
injury on the part of the recipient of false speech.”131 Having determined that
the law was indeed a content-based restriction on protected speech, the district
court therefore applied strict scrutiny, rebuffing the defendants’ insistence on a
more deferential standard of review.132 The district court, observing that at least
some lawmakers were motivated by the speech-suppressing desire to protect
“Iowa’s agricultural industry from perceived harms flowing from undercover
investigations of its facilities,” nonetheless considered whether the law could be
said to advance the state’s interests in protecting private property and
biosecurity.133 The district court concluded that the defendants had failed to
produce any evidence that the challenged provisions “are actually necessary to
protect perceived harms to property and biosecurity.”134
With the first law enjoined and an appeal pending,135 Iowa legislators went
back to the drawing board and produced a second version in just two months,
128. Id.
129. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds (Reynolds I), 297 F. Supp. 3d 901, 909–11 (S.D. Iowa
2018).
130. See id. at 919, 924.
131. Id. at 924. The false statements made by investigators attempting to obtain employment fell
short of causing tangible injury because, while they concealed ideological commitments and journalistic
affiliation, they did not relate to the applicant’s qualifications or relevant work experience (for example,
ability to drive a forklift). See id.
132. See id. at 919–20. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012)—the Supreme Court’s
controlling precedent on the constitutional protection for false statements—has left lower courts in a
state of some uncertainty as to the appropriate standard of review. See Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau,
Developing a Taxonomy of Lies Under the First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 673–74 (2018).
133. Reynolds II, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 824.
134. Id. at 825. The court noted that these interests were already served by several content neutral
restrictions in Iowa law, including existing trespass provisions and a law prohibiting “the willful
possession, transportation, or transfer of a ‘pathogen with an intent to threaten the health of an animal
or crop.’” Id. at 825–26 (quoting IOWA CODE § 717A.4(1) (Westlaw through legislation from the 2021
2d Extraordinary Sess.)).
135. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 8 F.4th 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2021). On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing with the district court that the employment
provision could not survive strict scrutiny but holding that the access provision was “consistent with
the First Amendment because it prohibits exclusively lies associated with a legally cognizable harm—
namely, trespass to private property.” Id. at 783, 785–87. The appellate court did not consider the
speech-suppressing motives revealed in the legislative history. See id. at 783–87.
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showing remarkable consistency in their concern about the reputational harms
suffered by the agricultural industry when exposed to negative publicity.136 One
state legislator advocated for the second bill’s passage by saying he would “not
stand by and allow [Iowa farmers] to be disparaged in the way they have
been.”137 Iowa State Senator Ken Rozenboom, whose own farm had been
revealed as a site of animal abuse in an undercover investigation,138 said the bill
would protect agriculture from “those who would intentionally use deceptive
practices to distort public perception of best practices to safely and responsibly
produce food.”139
Iowa’s second ag-gag law was signed into law by the Governor and again
challenged in federal court as an unconstitutional burden on speech.140 In
comparison to its predecessor, the second ag-gag law included a “revised intent
element,” limiting the scope of prohibited conduct to false statements made
with the “intent to cause physical or economic harm or other injury.”141 With
this revision, the defendants argued, the law became a permissible restriction
targeting only the kinds of speech lying outside the domain of First
Amendment protection.142 The defendants had clearly taken heed of the district
court’s concern about the prior version’s breadth and seemingly tried to bring
the second version into alignment with the principle that only speech causing
“legally cognizable harm or material gain to the speaker” lies outside of First
Amendment protection.143
The problem, as the district court noted in its review of the second version,
was that the new provision
appears to place no meaningful limit on the harm that would satisfy its
intent element—that is, it does not require the harm to be legally
cognizable, specific, tangible, actual, or material. On its face, an intent to

136. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 19-cv-00124, 2019 WL 8301668, at *2 (S.D. Iowa
Dec. 2, 2019) (noting that lawmakers described the purpose of the second ag-gag bill in terms similar
to those of the first bill).
137. Id.
138. See Donnelle Eller, Animal Rights Group Claims Animal Neglect at Farm of Iowa Senator Who
Backed Ag-Gag Law, DES MOINES REG., https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agri
culture/2020/01/24/animal-rights-group-claims-neglect-pigs-iowa-farm-ag-gag-supporter/4545787002
[https://perma.cc/L9YH-85K9] (Jan. 24, 2020, 9:46 AM). However, a subsequent investigation by the
county sheriff’s office and the Iowa Department of Agriculture found no evidence of animal abuse. See
Donnelle Eller, Animal Abuse Claims Against Iowa Senator Are ‘Unfounded,’ Say State, Local Investigators,
DES MOINES REG., https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/agriculture/2020/02/14/animal
-abuse-claims-iowa-senator-unfounded-say-state-local-investigators/4761422002/ [https://perma.cc/3
HC4-J4SD] (Feb. 15, 2020, 6:00 AM).
139. Reynolds, 2019 WL 8301668, at *2.
140. Eller, Judge Issues Order, supra note 116.
141. Reynolds, 2019 WL 8301668, at *5.
142. Id. at *3.
143. Id. at *5.
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cause any injury, no matter how trivial or subjective, would suffice to
establish the harm element of the statute.144
Most importantly, the district court noted, the harm element was broad enough
to include the reputational injury arising from “legitimate First Amendment
activity, such as truthful reporting on animal abuse or unsanitary conditions.”145
The defendants’ purported fix was thus merely a cosmetic one. Their
second bite at the law appeared responsive to the concern that the regulation of
speech must be targeted at the prevention of some injury, but the new version
endeavored to satisfy this doctrinal principle by including the consequences that
flow from critical coverage of the agricultural industry: the lost profits and
stature that an entity might suffer when the public learns what truly happens
behind its closed doors.146 By making this kind of harm a predicate for criminal
liability, the second version revealed itself to be just another vehicle for the
suppression of industry-critical speech. The second version did not actually
tailor its reach to the types of harms that a state is entitled to prevent when
deception is used to obtain access to an agricultural facility, such as an arsonist
lying about his intent to commit arson at the slaughterhouse where he is
attempting to obtain employment, or a competitor’s agent who lies about her
intent to steal trade secrets.147 Instead, the district court concluded that the
“scant record” supporting the state’s proffered interests, the “ready availability
of alternatives that burden substantially less speech,” and the “disconnect”
between the law’s means and the state’s asserted ends “suggest that the law’s
true purpose is to prohibit undercover investigations.”148 As with its
predecessor, the new law was motivated by the continuing desire “to prevent
critical coverage of the agricultural industry” and could not withstand the
heightened scrutiny required by the First Amendment.149

144. Id. at *6.
145. Id.
146. Id. Notably, the Iowa Attorney General could have disavowed this reading of the statute,
offering an authoritative narrowing construction and potentially mooting the case, but chose not to do
so. See id. at *7 (explaining that, instead, the State defendants had simply taken the “unsupported
position” that the challenged statute would not apply to whistle-blowing, labor organizing, and other
activities that might “cause an ‘economic harm or other injury’ to an agricultural production facility’s
‘business interest’”).
147. Id. at *6.
148. Id. at *18.
149. Id. Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the case was continued pending the Eighth
Circuit’s ruling on Iowa’s first ag-gag law. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 19-cv-00124,
2022 WL 777231, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 14, 2022). With the Eighth Circuit having issued its opinion
in August 2021, see supra note 135, the district court resumed its assessment of Iowa’s second ag-gag
law, and found once again that it violated the First Amendment. See id. at *12–13 (ruling that the
provision “discriminates based on viewpoint” and “fails strict scrutiny” and thus “transgress[es]
important First Amendment values”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 947 (2022)

970

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Within six months of that ruling, Iowa lawmakers enacted a third
version.150 The third version is substantially improved in the sense that it does
not specifically regulate speech or expression; rather than prohibit deception,
false statements, or misrepresentation, the new law criminalizes “food operation
trespass” committed by a person “entering or remaining on the property of a
food operation without the consent of a person who has real or apparent
authority to allow the person to enter or remain on the property.”151 The
legislative history, however, again reveals a clear motive to suppress the
circulation of disturbing and politically charged images that “don’t always look
good” by “organizations out there that simply don’t want people to eat meat.”152
In debating the third version, Iowa lawmakers still could not resist the
temptation to describe the bill as one necessary to prevent animal rights activists
from recording slaughterhouse operations and bringing negative scrutiny to the
industry through the release of those recordings. One state legislator, after
emphasizing the importance of the jobs provided by Iowa’s agricultural industry
and recalling his own family’s history of employment in Iowa slaughterhouses,
explained that when someone trespasses onto a slaughterhouse floor, they can
“take a video of what are actually very humane practices and make them appear
sociopathic,” and bring “dishonor to very honorable work that is done by
thousands of Iowans day in and day out.”153 Another legislator specified that the
goal of such investigations “is to eliminate production agriculture when it comes
to animals. The harm that is done by taking a video of something that has been
done by the book every single step of the way can be immense.”154
In this third iteration, then, we have a statute that on its face appears to
be a permissible trespass provision, regulating unauthorized presence in a
certain type of facility rather than expression of a certain disfavored kind. But
the floor debate suggests otherwise, revealing an unmistakable continuity in
legislative purpose stretching back through prior versions of the bill—laws that
have already been deemed unconstitutional for their speech-suppressing
qualities. If the third version’s “true purpose is to prohibit undercover
investigations,” as the district court determined with regards to the first and
second versions, then how much should it matter that the Iowa legislature has

150. See Lauren Belin, Iowa’s Ag Gag 3.0 May Get Past Courts, BLEEDING HEARTLAND (June 28,
2020), https://www.bleedingheartland.com/2020/06/28/iowas-ag-gag-3-0-may-get-past-courts/ [https
://perma.cc/9JR8-CENG].
151. IOWA CODE § 716.7A(2)(e)(2) (Westlaw through legislation from the 2021 2d Extraordinary
Sess.).
152. Belin, supra note 150.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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managed to find a superficially neutral vehicle with which to advance that
goal?155
Animal rights activists are something of an emerging movement, and Iowa
legislators have not yet realized that when they openly proclaim their antipathy
toward that particular viewpoint, they imperil the laws with which they hope to
burden the movement.156 But we can expect that the legislators will get there
eventually—they are, after all, receiving an intensive tutorial from the federal
courts reviewing their work product. Assuming that they are, at some point,
finally able to enact a bill that is both facially neutral and unblemished by
expressions of animus toward particular kinds of expression, should the
sanitized version be scrutinized without reference to the entire history that
preceded it?
The chronology of Iowa’s efforts to enact an ag-gag law that can withstand
judicial review illustrates two dynamics that may at first appear in tension with
one another. By attempting to add a harm element in the second version, and
then eliminating altogether the regulation of speech in the third, Iowa
lawmakers showed an apparent responsiveness to judicial explication of what
the First Amendment requires.157 But these efforts were accompanied and
undermined by the somewhat surprising candor with which lawmakers
continued to express their antipathy toward the animal rights movement they
desired to hamstring. As other scholars have observed, legislators generally have
the wit “to avoid words like ‘race’ or the name of a particular racial group” in
the text of their legislation or during floor debates.158 But when we look at
lawmaking that targets a newer, less deeply rooted social movement—before
the development of social and constitutional norms that disfavor expressions of
hostility toward that group—we have moments of transparency that afford a
155. Id. As expressed by one of the challengers, the executive director of the ACLU of Iowa:
“While the text of the bill doesn’t seem like an attack on free speech, if in practice the goal is to stop
speech then we believe that continues to be unconstitutional.” Donnelle Eller, Iowa’s New Ag
Trespass Law Seeks To ‘Intimidate and Silence’ Animal Rights Activists, USA TODAY, https://www.usa
today.com/story/money/2020/06/12/iowa-legislature-ag-gag-law-critics-silence-whistleblowers/53467
73002/ [https://perma.cc/3W52-WAWC] (June 13, 2020, 3:36 PM).
156. In contrast, contemporary legislators are unlikely to proclaim openly, as they did in the past,
that they have gathered to pass laws to establish white supremacy. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (explaining that, in 1901, “delegates to the all-white convention were not secretive
about their purpose” and “zeal for white supremacy”). But see Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW.
U. L. REV. 505, 506 (2018) (“White supremacy and misogyny have once again revealed themselves as
potent forces in American social life.” (footnotes omitted)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has noted
that “floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative
history.” NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 943 (2017).
157. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
158. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) (“If legislators
have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like ‘race’ or the name of a particular racial
group in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally apply ordinary rational basis review. This
tendency is true even if the state action has an egregiously negative impact on a protected group.”).
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measure of insight into legislative purpose. These glimpses will inevitably be
short-lived, however, as lawmakers experience the consequences of that candor.
The coalition of plaintiffs that successfully challenged Iowa’s first two aggag laws has not yet filed suit to enjoin the third version.159 If they do, the
newest law’s primary weakness will be statements made on the floor by
legislators revealing the persistence of a speech-suppressing motive. If the law
is enjoined on that basis, the message to Iowa lawmakers will be clear: the path
forward for ag-gag laws must not include sentiments of animus against animal
rights activists or exhortations against the circulation of images “that don’t
always look good.”160
Ultimately, both the textual revisions that brought the third version of the
law into closer compliance with the First Amendment and the expressions of
hostility against animal rights activists—which will likely be driven
underground at some point as the ag-gag struggle matures—illustrate a central
point about second-bite lawmaking. Litigation is information forcing in a way
that works to the benefit of lawmakers determined to stay the chosen course as
much as courts will permit. Each round comes with an updated set of
instructions for how to pass constitutional muster, even as lawmakers persist
with the suspect project. By following these instructions, savvy legislators
should eventually be able to launder the appearance of impermissible intent out
of their work product.161 We should, in fact, expect that subsequent iterations
159. They have, however, challenged another statute enacted by the Iowa legislature in April 2021,
Act of Apr. 30, 2021, 2021 Iowa Acts 224 (codified at IOWA CODE § 727.8A (2022)), that creates a
new crime applying to someone who commits a trespass and “knowingly places or uses a camera or
electronic surveillance device that transmits or records images or data while the device is on the
trespassed property.” See Civil Rights Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 1, 9, Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 21-cv-00231, 2021 WL 3522352, at *1–2 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 10, 2021)
(quoting IOWA CODE § 727.8A (Westlaw through legislation from the 2021 2d Extraordinary Sess.)).
Whether this latest effort should be described as Iowa’s fourth ag-gag law is profoundly interesting for
our purposes. On the one hand, the newest law does not so much as mention food, animals, or
agriculture and is not limited in any way to trespasses that occur in slaughterhouses or other agricultural
facilities. On the other, the plaintiffs allege in their complaint that this expanded breadth is an evasive
strategy designed to escape the constraints of the previous ag-gag rulings, asserting that the newest law
“seeks to create the gloss of legitimacy by applying to industries beyond agriculture, so that the State
can claim its aim is not just to prevent pro-animal speech. And it targets speech alongside other
activities, so that the State can claim its real aim is to prohibit conduct, not speech.” Id. ¶ 14. The
plaintiffs included in their complaint numerous statements by legislators revealing that the “true
purpose” of the newest effort is “to deter and punish the same investigations Iowa previously sought
to repress with its other Ag-Gag laws.” Id. ¶ 22. For a brief summary of Iowa’s entire ag-gag trajectory,
including this latest effort, see Elizabeth Rumley, “Ag-Gag” Laws: An Update of Recent Legal
Developments, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://nationalaglawcenter.org/ag-gag-laws-anupdate-of-recent-legal-developments/ [https://perma.cc/PQK3-F5RH].
160. See Belin, supra note 150.
161. As Professor Brandon Garrett observes, the damage to government legitimacy remains,
especially given the many doctrinal hurdles that courts have placed in front of plaintiffs challenging
state action. See Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1471,
1474–77 (2018).
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will be sanitized of the offending elements and superficially compliant with
constitutional principles.162
For courts reviewing these subsequent iterations, this presents a
conundrum: Do these changes reflect an authentic recalibration, a reshaping of
policy preferences to accommodate the constitutional principles expressed in
the prior ruling? Or does the appearance of neutralizing elements in later stages
of constitutional struggle indicate merely a strategic adaptation meant to
conceal an ongoing illicit purpose? As readers are likely to recognize, this
question took center stage in the nationwide litigation over the multiple
iterations of the Trump administration’s Muslim ban. As detailed in the next
section, much of the controversy turned on the appropriate inferences to draw
from a government defendant’s strategic adaptations—especially when those
adjustments contrast sharply with continued expressions of illicit motive made
in extrinsic statements.
3. President Trump’s “Muslim Ban”
On January 27, 2017, within a week of taking office, President Trump
issued an executive order “designed to make his most incendiary campaign
rhetoric a reality.”163 On the campaign trail, Trump promised “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”164 and justified the
proposal by asserting that President Franklin D. Roosevelt “did the same thing”
162. For scholarship exploring various facets of this phenomenon, see, for example, Reva Siegel,
“The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119–20 (1996)
(explaining “preservation through transformation” as the process by which reform movements pressure
lawmakers “to rationalize status-enforcing state action in new and less socially controversial terms”);
Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law, 2012 UTAH
L. REV. 1773, 1776 (“[Anti-evasion doctrines] seek to prevent officials from complying with the form
of the previously announced rule, while subverting the substance of the constitutional principle the
rule sought to implement. Put differently, they attempt to optimize constitutional enforcement by
curbing circumvention of constitutional principles.”); Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI.
L. REV. 929, 943 (2014) (describing “backup” laws which are “designed to preserve as much as possible
of a legal model that either has recently been invalidated or seems certain to be invalidated in the near
future” in order to “attempt to extend the life of a model that has been marked for extinction”); Jacob
Hutt, Note, Compliant Subversion, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2017) (describing a theory of legal
gamesmanship termed “compliant subversion,” which “obstruct[s a] law[] by mapping out its various
manifestations, tracking how courts respond to them, and considering when such responses are
inappropriate”); David King, Responding to Unconstitutional State Opportunism, 87 MISS. L.J. 79, 81
(2018) (describing constitutional struggle, such as the white primary battles, as presenting a story about
“opportunism—the problem of sophisticated parties evading the purposes of legal norms”).
163. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Trump v. Hawaii and the Future of Presidential Power over Immigration,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/trump-v-hawaii-andthe-future-of-presidential-power-over-immigration/#_ftnref2 [https://perma.cc/S629-ZEK3]; see also
Josh Blackman, The Travel Bans, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 30 (explaining that the travel bans
“traced their roots to overtly anti-Muslim statements made by then-candidate Trump” and that “the
government could only offer the faintest patina of a rational basis to defend the policies”).
164. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The full
statement “remained on his campaign website until May 2017,” several months into his presidency. Id.
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with the internment of Japanese Americans.165 In the executive order, he
prohibited the entry of nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen,166 all of which have majority Muslim populations.167 The order
included a waiver provision allowing individual refugee admissions on a caseby-case basis, contingent on the determination “that the admission of such
individuals as refugees is in the national interest—including when the person is
a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution.”168
The day he signed the order, President Trump explained to the media that the
order would give priority to Christian refugee applicants and was designed “‘to
help’ the Christians in Syria.”169
For individuals outside of the waiver provision, the ban’s breadth was
immense—covering entrants of every status, including lawful permanent
residents and existing visa holders who were, quite literally, in the air en route
to the United States.170 Its immediate implementation, conducted without
interagency review or coordination, “unleashed chaos within the government
and across the country.”171 Lawsuits were filed in federal courts throughout the
nation, asserting that the order exceeded the President’s statutory authority and
violated the Establishment Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause.172 The order was temporarily enjoined within a week of its
issuance, and the temporary restraining order was upheld by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals less than a week after that.173

165. Id.
166. Id. at 2403 (majority opinion); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (Jan. 27,
2017).
167. Muslim Travel Ban, IMMIGR. HIST., https://immigrationhistory.org/item/muslim-travel-ban/
[https://perma.cc/QD6S-RCYQ].
168. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8979 (Jan. 27, 2017).
169. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. See Trump’s Executive Order: Who Does Travel Ban Affect?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302 [https://perma.cc/WL5U-F5EZ].
171. W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the Breakdown of IntraExecutive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J.F. 825, 830 (2018) (describing how the State Department
immediately stopped conducting visa interviews and processing visa applications for citizens of the
seven banned countries, revoked between 60,000 and 100,000 visas, and detained nationals arriving
from those countries at airports for hours while awaiting assistance).
172. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406; see also Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Clear Violation, SLATE
(Jan. 30, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/here-are-all-the-parts-of-theconstitution-trumps-muslim-ban-violates.html [https://perma.cc/8K74-CBQA].
173. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017)
(concluding preliminarily that “significant and ongoing” harm was being inflicted by the executive
order, which plaintiffs were likely going to be able to prove was unlawful), motion for stay pending appeal
denied, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting government’s request for emergency stay of
temporary restraining order).
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Rather than continue to defend the order, the administration withdrew it
and issued a second one in its place.174 The second order was narrower in scope:
it omitted Iraq from the list of barred countries,175 exempted lawful permanent
residents and holders of diplomatic visas,176 and applied only to new visa
applicants rather than current visa holders.177 It no longer included the language
in the waiver provision, applicable to members of “a religious minority” in their
“country of nationality,”178 that had been touted by the President as a means to
give Christian applicants priority over Muslims.179 But the second version was
characterized by President Trump himself as just “‘a watered down, politically
correct version’ of the [first order].”180 He expressed rather candidly that he
would have preferred to follow through more explicitly on a “total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” but “stupidly, that would
not be politically correct.”181 Even as President Trump issued his third
attempt,182 the second order having also been enjoined by federal courts,183 the
White House Deputy Press Secretary drew the connection between the latest
effort and the President’s past remarks. He noted “that ‘the President has been
174. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13212 (Mar. 6, 2017); see also Washington v.
Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 3774041, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017) (granting government’s motion
to dismiss appeal of Executive Order 13769); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL
2172020, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 17, 2017) (“On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued EO2, which
expressly revokes EO1.”).
175. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13210–12 (Mar. 6, 2017). According to the New
York Times, this revision was requested by Secretary of Defense Mattis, who expressed concern that
barring Iraqi nationals “would hamper coordination to defeat the Islamic State.” Glenn Thrush, Trump’s
New Travel Ban Blocks Migrants from Six Nations, Sparing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/travel-ban-muslim-trump.html [https://perma.cc/RTF6-JU
YS (dark archive)].
176. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13213–14 (Mar. 6, 2017).
177. Id. at 13213. As explained by David Cole, national legal director of the ACLU, “The decision
to exempt current visa-holders also means that the order does not strip individuals in the US of rights
previously granted to them, as the first order did.” David Cole, It’s Still a Muslim Ban, N.Y. REV. (Mar.
11, 2017), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/03/11/its-still-a-muslim-ban-trump-executive-order/
[https://perma.cc/8W2T-LVWV (dark archive)].
178. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8979 (Jan. 27, 2017).
179. See Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13214–15 (Mar. 6, 2017). It did, however,
continue to allow case-by-case exemptions for individual refugees. Id. at 13214.
180. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2437 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2438.
182. Both the first and second orders instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a
review of the adequacy of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking
to enter the United States. Id. at 2403–04 (majority opinion); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg.
8977, 8977–78 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209, 13212 (Mar. 6, 2017). The
review was completed in September 2017, and the third order followed shortly thereafter. Trump, 138
S. Ct. at 2404.
183. Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2017) (“Plaintiffs have met their
burden of establishing a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim,
that irreparable injury is likely if the requested relief is not issued, and that the balance of the equities
and public interest counsel in favor of granting the requested relief.”).
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talking about these security issues for years now, from the campaign trail to the
White House’ and ‘has addressed these issues with the travel order that he
issued earlier this year and the companion proclamation.’”184
The third effort, styled as a “proclamation,” purported to announce the
results of a worldwide assessment of security protocols that President Trump
requested in the first and second orders.185 To conduct the assessment,
government agencies prepared a baseline of “information required from foreign
governments to confirm the identity of individuals seeking entry into the
United States . . . to determine whether those individuals pose a security
threat.”186 After an initial evaluation, the Department of Homeland Security
pursued diplomatic efforts with sixteen countries, identified in the worldwide
review as having inadequate protocols, to improve their practices.187 At the end
of the fifty-day period allocated for these efforts,188 seven countries were
deemed to remain deficient in their risk profiles and information-sharing
practices, and nationals from these countries were subject to the entry
restrictions outlined in the third order.189
Unlike the first and second versions of the orders, the third at least
nominally included two countries that are not majority-Muslim: Venezuela and
North Korea.190 For the government defending the proclamation, which was
again subjected to immediate challenge and enjoined in the lower federal
courts,191 this was an important display of the proclamation’s religious

184. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (quoting Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233,
267 (4th Cir.), judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (mem.)).
185. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). Skepticism immediately
arose as to “whether the world-wide review and its results were genuine national security exercises or
after-the-fact veneers to make raw discrimination fit within the confines of accepted presidential
behavior.” Rodríguez, supra note 163.
186. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404; see also Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45162 (Sept.
24, 2017).
187. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2405.
188. Fact Sheet: The President’s Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/24/fact-sheet-president-s-proclamation-enhan
cing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes [https://perma.cc/7VTQ-3UV7] (Apr. 10, 2018).
189. The countries covered in the third order were: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria,
Venezuela, and Yemen. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45163 (Sept. 24, 2017). Iraq also
failed to meet the baseline, but the Secretary of Homeland Security determined that entry restrictions
were “not warranted” in light of Iraq’s particular circumstances, including “the close cooperative
relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq.” Id.
190. Id.
191. State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1145 (D. Haw.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 878 F.3d
662 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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neutrality.192 In Trump v. Hawaii,193 a majority of the Supreme Court agreed
that the third order, “say[ing] nothing about religion,” could be sustained as a
measure advancing the “legitimate national security interest” of “preventing
entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations
to improve their practices.”194 But as Justice Sotomayor explained in her dissent,
the introduction of a superficially neutralizing element, like the inclusion of
North Korea and Venezuela, may be evidence of exactly the impermissible
intent the defendant is trying to conceal—an effort to avoid “criticism or legal
consequences”195 for what continues to function as a “religious gerrymander.”196
The inclusion of superficially neutralizing elements looked very different on the
third try, after multiple rounds of litigation, than it would have as part of the
first attempt—especially when accompanied by a long and continuing history
of anti-Muslim remarks. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion, however,
refused “to invalidate a national security directive regulating the entry of aliens
abroad”197 that “is facially neutral toward religion” on the basis of “extrinsic
statements.”198
B.

Lessons and Implications

Observers were quick to critique the Trump v. Hawaii opinion, echoing
Justice Sotomayor’s frustration with the majority’s refusal to credit the
President’s own characterizations of the motive animating the three orders.199
192. Brief for the Petitioners at 65, Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965) (emphasizing the
“inclusion of two new non-Muslim-majority countries” to argue that “the Proclamation does not target
aliens based on their religion”).
193. 138 S. Ct. 2392.
194. Id. at 2421–22.
195. Id. at 2442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Proclamation’s effect on North Korea and
Venezuela, for example, is insubstantial, if not entirely symbolic. A prior sanctions order already
restricts entry of North Korean nationals, and the Proclamation targets only a handful of Venezuelan
government officials and their immediate family members. As such, the President’s inclusion of North
Korea and Venezuela does little to mitigate the anti-Muslim animus that permeates the Proclamation.”
(citations omitted)).
196. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535–
36 (1993)) (explaining that the term “religious gerrymander” was used to describe and invalidate a
prohibition on animal sacrifice that had been carefully drawn to burden only the practices of the
Santeria religion, while leaving undisturbed every other form of animal killing).
197. Id. at 2418 (majority opinion). The majority emphasized that this made the case different
“from the conventional Establishment Clause claim . . . involving religious displays or school prayer.”
Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134
HARV. L. REV. 1, 222 (2020). Professor Klarman compares the Muslim ban to the internment of
Japanese Americans, concluding that
[t]he Muslim travel ban was not so very different. President Trump’s animus towards Muslims
was open and notorious, and it was shared by a majority of Republicans, who view Muslims
as a national security threat per se, which is how many Americans saw people of Japanese
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Others, however, cautioned that this approach was confined to the unique
context of presidential power over immigration.200 The opinion, repeatedly
emphasizing the unique concerns of national security and executive
immigration enforcement, substantiates this reading.201 As explored later in this
Article, the Supreme Court’s resolution of the Muslim ban controversy leaves
open long-standing questions about the appropriate way to scrutinize iterative
lawmaking outside this specialized context. Where the Supreme Court is not
driven by deference to the executive on matters concerning national security,
what is the appropriate way to evaluate the strategic addition of superficially
neutralizing elements by a defendant lawmaker with a long and consistent
history of illicit motive? Do these changes cure the discriminatory intent or
offer proof of it?
In short, across the three contexts explored above as well as many others,
constitutional struggle is an iterative rather than a single-stage process, offering
a rich and potentially cumulative picture of the government officials involved
in the origination and implementation of the challenged law and its
predecessors. At first blush, this may seem like a trivial descriptive point that
has little relevance beyond the “procedural history” section of an opinion. But
as these examples demonstrate, the presiding court’s willingness to consider and
draw inferences from previous iterations of a challenged law will eventually

descent in 1942. Many experts ridiculed the Muslim travel ban as irrelevant to national
security . . . [contending that] creative government lawyers laundered the ban to make it
facially neutral and created exceptions and waiver provisions as “window dressing” . . . .
Id. (footnotes omitted). As Justice Sotomayor had done in Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), scholars also noted the contrast between the lack of significance
accorded to Trump’s statements of anti-Muslim animus and the seriousness with which the majority
had taken the “less pervasive official expressions of hostility and the failure to disavow them.” Trump,
138 S. Ct. at 2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman,
The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135 (2018) (“[I]t is impossible to ignore the obvious
inconsistency between the Court’s demand for tolerance and respect in Masterpiece and its abdication
of that demand in Trump v. Hawaii . . . .”).
200. See, e.g., Rodríguez, supra note 163 (“[L]ower courts and commentators can and should
actively read Trump v. Hawaii as limited to its very particular context—to an intent-based antidiscrimination claim against the decision to exclude non-citizens, for national security reasons, on the
precipice of entry and outside the custody and control of the United States.”); Aziz Z. Huq, Article II
and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47, 50 (2019) (“[I]t is Article II and Article II alone
that now comes packaged with open-textured discretion to discriminate on the basis of suspect
classification, and to do so relatively candidly.”).
201. The majority opinion states that “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a
‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune
from judicial control.’” Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). It
further insists that “‘[a]ny rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility’ of the President
‘to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution,’ and our
inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly constrained.” Id. at 2419–20 (quoting
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
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become outcome determinative as government defendants learn to conceal the
defects that were fatal to prior versions.
As illustrated by all three of the foregoing examples, a central piece of the
puzzle concerns the intent underlying the challenged law and its successors.202
When intent is constitutionally significant,203 how keen should we be to trace
its presence across multiple iterations of lawmaking? When a court finds a law
to be constitutionally invalid and the lawmaker goes back to the drawing board,
how should we assess whether the impermissible intent lingers covertly—as
pernicious as before but in less visible form? While the lawmakers in question
may have heeded the admonishment from the court and avoided an open
restatement of the invalid intent, is it not an obvious fiction that the
impermissible intent has now been scrubbed clean from the new version of the
law? On the other hand, if it strikes us as troubling to treat the new law as if it
were written on a blank slate, then at what point, if ever, can a subsequent
iteration of a law that was previously invalidated outrun the stain of its
predecessor? How long does impermissible intent linger—and whose burden
should it be to establish its presence or absence? As detailed in the next part,
the Supreme Court’s guidance on these questions has been profoundly
inconsistent.
II. COMPETING APPROACHES TO SECOND-BITE LAWMAKING
This part provides a detailed look at the Supreme Court’s forays into
successive lawmaking, revealing a sequence of cases that together offer a set of
principles tailored to this context. The Supreme Court has understood that
there is something significant about evaluating the progeny of an invalidated
law, but it has changed direction rather dramatically. Where the Supreme Court
was once willing to acknowledge that later versions of a law can be traceable to
prior unconstitutional conduct, it has more recently announced a “presumption
of legislative good faith” that threatens to be perplexingly resistant to evidence
of the contrary.
As is shown in this part, Arlington Heights explicitly set forth a
methodology in which courts were encouraged to scrutinize and draw inferences
from prior iterations of a challenged law. Building on this understanding, the
Supreme Court offered a robust “traceability” analysis in United States v.
Fordice,204 and subsequently used a scaled-back but still distinctive version of it
in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky.205 However, with its 2018 decision in

202. See Garrett, supra note 161, at 1474.
203. See Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1337, 1340, 1350
(2019) (noting that “intent requirements are a familiar feature of the constitutional landscape”).
204. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
205. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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Abbott v. Perez,206 the Supreme Court conveyed overt hostility to the idea that
a successor law might remain infected with the discriminatory purpose of prior
versions.
A.

Arlington Heights as Origin Point

To understand the doctrinal landscape for iterative lawmaking,
particularly in contexts where the defendant’s intent is constitutionally relevant,
the place to begin is Arlington Heights, in which the Supreme Court provided
guidance to plaintiffs newly tasked with the burden to show that a facially
neutral law or policy was motived by discriminatory intent.207 Recognizing that
direct evidence of improper purpose may often be unavailable, the Supreme
Court explicitly endorsed a “sensitive inquiry” that would attend to whatever
forms of circumstantial evidence might shed light on the decisionmaker’s
purpose: (1) historical background; (2) the specific sequence of events leading
to the law’s enactment, including any departures from the normal legislative
process; (3) the law’s legislative history; and (4) whether the law “bears more
heavily on one race than another.”208
The Court explained that “[t]he historical background of the decision is
one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken
for invidious purposes.”209 Among the cases cited as illustrative were Lane v.
Wilson210 and Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,211 both
presenting chronologies of successive lawmaking in which government officials
sought to evade the consequences of prior rulings against discriminatory
policies.212 Close scrutiny of iterative lawmaking also fits seamlessly with the
206. 138 S. Ct. 2305.
207. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). The Supreme Court had just the previous
term announced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that racially disproportionate impact
alone was insufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 242.
208. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68.
209. Id. at 267.
210. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
211. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
212. Griffin concerned the thirteen-year saga to desegregate the public schools in Prince Edward
County, Virginia. Id. at 220–21. Rather than comply with the desegregation order in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the school board of Prince Edward County closed its public schools
and contributed funds to a tuition grant program that helped defray the costs of attending a private
school that was only available to white students. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 220–24. Virginia not only
acquiesced in the closure but contributed state funds to the tuition grant program. Id. at 221. The
Supreme Court—while reiterating the “wide discretion” that states typically have in their treatment of
county policies—agreed with the district court that, “under the circumstances here,” the school closure
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 225, 231. In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), the
Supreme Court invalidated Oklahoma’s effort to impose a twelve-day voter registration period, after
which anyone who failed to register would be permanently disenfranchised. Id. at 275–76. Exempted
from this punishingly short deadline was anyone who had been qualified to vote in 1914, when voting
eligibility in Oklahoma was limited to those who either passed a literacy test or were the lineal
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Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that “[t]he specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on the
decisionmaker’s purposes.”213 Here, the Supreme Court offered as illustrative
Reitman v. Mulkey,214 in which it upheld the California Supreme Court’s
determination that a ballot proposition repealing the state’s antidiscrimination
laws, properly viewed in its full context, would involve the state in, rather than
remove the state from, private racial discrimination in housing.215 A lower
court’s authority to scrutinize and draw inferences from previous iterations of a
challenged law also squares with the Supreme Court’s instruction that “[t]he
legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where
there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports.”216 In sum, paying careful attention to, and
drawing inferences from, prior iterations of a challenged law is incontrovertibly
encompassed within the four factors offered in Arlington Heights as a method to
examine facially neutral laws.
As is now well established, the method outlined in Arlington Heights applies
not only in equal protection cases, but also in religious liberty cases217 and other
contexts that call for inquiry into official purpose.218 And so, at a sufficiently
descendant of a white voter. Id. at 269–71. The twelve-day registration period was enacted after the
grandfather clause was invalidated, and as the Supreme Court recognized, “was obviously directed
towards the consequences” of the prior ruling. Id. As such, it was similarly invalid. Id. at 275–77.
213. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
214. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
215. Id. at 370–75; see also id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Proposition 14 is a form of
sophisticated discrimination whereby the people of California harness the energies of private groups
to do indirectly what they cannot under our decisions allow their government to do.” (footnotes
omitted)). The Supreme Court of California rejected the contention that the state was merely adopting
a stance of neutrality, explaining that the proposition, taken in its full context, could not be viewed as
such:
[T]he state, recognizing that it could not perform a direct act of discrimination, nevertheless
has taken affirmative action of a legislative nature designed to make possible private
discriminatory practices which previously were legally restricted. . . . Here the state has
affirmatively acted to change its existing laws from a situation wherein the discrimination
practiced was legally restricted to one wherein it is encouraged . . . .
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), aff’d, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
216. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
217. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993)
(applying Arlington Heights in a Free Exercise Clause case); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594–
95 (1987) (noting that Establishment Clause inquiry looks to “[t]he plain meaning of the statute’s
words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history, . . . the historical
context of the statute, . . . and the specific sequence of events leading to [its] passage”).
218. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 164 (2015) (noting that facially contentneutral laws will be considered content-based regulations of speech if they were adopted by the
government “because of disagreement with the message” conveyed by the speech); Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276, 287 n.2 (1977) (considering a First Amendment
dispute over whether a public school teacher had been fired for engaging in protected speech, citing
Arlington Heights for the proposition that plaintiff had shown that his speech was a “motivating factor”
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high level of generality, the key principles are clear: historical background and
legislative context, including contemporary statements of decisionmakers, are
relevant and should be considered whenever a court is asked to adjudicate
questions of improper purpose. An assessment of repeated cycles of lawmaking
and litigation leading up to the consideration of the defendants’ latest effort fits
comfortably within this paradigm.
We thus see widespread recognition across a range of contexts that
previous iterations of a challenged law may be considered as part of an Arlington
Heights-endorsed inquiry into discriminatory purpose, but from there, the
clarity diminishes.219 The Supreme Court’s subsequent forays into this area have
produced wildly different approaches.
B.

United States v. Fordice: Current Practices Are Traceable

As the Supreme Court clearly anticipated in Arlington Heights, the
framework it provided for determining when facially neutral laws disguise
improper purpose would, regrettably, continue to have wide application. When
it comes to persistence in unconstitutional conduct, efforts to maintain
educational segregation certainly compete for primacy with the kinds of voter
suppression efforts we considered in the previous part. In 1992, nearly forty
years after Brown v. Board of Education,220 the Supreme Court examined
Mississippi’s ongoing failure to integrate its public system of higher
education.221 Mississippi maintained a de jure policy of segregation in its
university system until 1962, when the first Black student was admitted to the
University of Mississippi by court order.222 In addition to the University of
Mississippi, the state maintained four other universities serving only white
students, as well as three universities whose student populations were entirely
Black.223 The court order did little to produce any additional progress toward

in his termination). For a prominent scholarly treatment of the improper motive component of free
speech doctrine, see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (“First Amendment law, as developed by the
Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery
of improper governmental motives. The doctrine comprises a series of tools to flush out illicit motives
and to invalidate actions infected with them. Or, to put the point another way, the application of First
Amendment law is best understood and most readily explained as a kind of motive-hunting.”); see also
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1198 (9th Cir. 2018) (evaluating Idaho’s ag-gag
law and observing that its reach “is so broad that it gives rise to suspicion that it may have been enacted
with an impermissible purpose” and that “a vocal number of supporters were less concerned with the
protection of property than they were about protecting a target group from critical speech”).
219. See infra Sections III.B–E.
220. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
221. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 723–24 (1992).
222. Id. at 722.
223. Id.
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racial integration, and enforcement efforts by federal agencies were similarly
unavailing.224
In 1975, a group of private plaintiffs filed suit against the state, asserting
that Mississippi maintained the racially segregative effects of its prior system
of dual education in violation of the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act.225
The parties then attempted for twelve years “to achieve a consensual resolution
of their differences through voluntary dismantlement by the State of its prior
separated system.”226 But, in 1987, the system remained highly segregated, and
the parties proceeded to trial because “they could not agree on whether the State
had taken the requisite affirmative steps to dismantle its prior de jure segregated
system.”227
There was no dispute that “[w]here a state has previously maintained a
racially dual system of public education established by law, it assumes an
‘affirmative duty’ to reform those policies and practices which required or
contributed to the separation of races.”228 Applying that principle after a trial
consisting of seventy-one witnesses and over 56,000 pages of exhibits, the
district court found that Mississippi fulfilled its duty.229 The court of appeals
affirmed, observing that “the record makes clear that Mississippi has adopted
and implemented race neutral policies for operating its colleges and universities
and that all students have real freedom of choice to attend the college or
university they wish.”230
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that “a State does not
discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and practices
traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster segregation.”231
If the state perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior system that
continue to have segregative effects, it has not sufficiently dismantled its prior
dual system—it is not enough to simply abolish the legal requirements that
white and Black students be educated separately and adopt racially neutral
policies “not animated by a discriminatory purpose.”232 The Supreme Court
then proceeded to identify several “unconstitutional remnants” of Mississippi’s
224. The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) initiated enforcement
efforts in 1969. Id. The Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning
(“Board”) responded with a meager set of proposals that HEW rejected as insufficient. Id. at 722–23.
The Board nonetheless proceeded with that plan, only to have the state legislature withhold its funding
until 1978, and then fund it at “well under half” of what the Board had requested. Id. at 723.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 724.
227. Id. at 725.
228. Id. at 726.
229. Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1526, 1564 (N.D. Miss. 1987), vacated sub nom. Ayers v.
Fordice, 970 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1992).
230. Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717.
231. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 728, 743 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 731–32.
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prior system—policies that, while race neutral on their face, “substantially
restrict a person’s choice of which institution to enter, and they contribute to
the racial identifiability of the eight public universities.”233
Most importantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court explicitly
criticized the district court for having “improperly shifted the burden away from
the State” and onto the plaintiffs.234 Concurring Justices wrote separately “to
emphasize that it is Mississippi’s burden to prove that it has undone its prior
segregation.”235 Even Justice Thomas, often characterized as the Supreme
Court’s most conservative member,236 acknowledged the force of this procedural
principle in his separate concurrence, written to emphasize that the affirmative
duty required of postsecondary institutions was different than what was
previously announced for grade school systems.237 Clarifying that the Fordice
opinion therefore did not portend “the destruction of historically black
colleges,” Justice Thomas explained:
It is safe to assume that a policy adopted during the de jure era, if it
produces segregative effects, reflects a discriminatory intent. As long as
that intent remains, of course, such a policy cannot continue. And given
an initially tainted policy, it is eminently reasonable to make the State
bear the risk of nonpersuasion with respect to intent at some future time,
both because the State has created the dispute through its own prior
unlawful conduct, and because discriminatory intent does tend to persist
through time.238
Fordice is important for two distinct reasons. First, it is grounded upon the
recognition that current practices are traceable to prior practices even where they
233. Id. at 732–34 (noting that the policies with lingering “discriminatory taint” included the role
of ACT scores in university admissions policies, the unnecessary duplication of programs, and the
designation of institutional mission at the eight universities in Mississippi’s postsecondary system).
234. Id. at 739.
235. Id. at 744 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
236. See, e.g., Corey Robin, Clarence Thomas’s Radical Vision of Race, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/essay/clarence-thomass-radical-vision-of-race [https://perma.cc/
6YZ2-P4GU (dark archive)] (“By consensus, Thomas is the most conservative member of the Court.”);
Michael O’Donnell, Deconstructing Clarence Thomas, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/09/deconstructing-clarence-thomas/594775/ [https://perma.cc/93
SG-2D7S (dark archive)] (“Thomas is by far the most conservative justice on a very conservative
Court.”). For empirical scholarship comparing Justice Thomas’s conservatism with that of other
Justices, see Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideology and the
Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 705, 713 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012)
(observing that Justice Thomas has been generally considered to be one of “the most reliably
conservative members of the Rehnquist Court (and now the Roberts Court)”). This status may be
changing with Justice Barrett’s confirmation. Greg Stohr, David Yaffe-Bellany & Lydia Wheeler,
Barrett Could Be Most Conservative Justice Since Clarence Thomas, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-26/barrett-could-be-most-conservative-justice-sin
ce-clarence-thomas [https://perma.cc/534A-E5SR (dark archive)].
237. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 746 (Thomas, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 745–47 (citations omitted).
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have significantly changed form, assuming a less obviously offensive demeanor.
Second, Fordice clearly announced that the appropriate way to adjudicate
whether current practices are traceable to prior unconstitutional conduct is to
place the burden on the state to demonstrate that the link has been severed.239
The traceability insight, combined with the explicit burden-shifting
requirement, would have had a profoundly forceful effect on second-bite
lawmaking were this approach applied as widely as it might have been. But as
we see when we turn to subsequent cases in this trajectory, it becomes clear that
the Supreme Court has stopped short of wielding Fordice’s full potential.
In reflecting on why this is so, one might wonder whether any principles
deriving from the precise context addressed in Fordice can shed light on more
recent forms of unconstitutional conduct. A clear, de jure violation—like the
one invalidated in one of the Supreme Court’s most canonical cases and
manifested by Mississippi’s system of postsecondary education for years
thereafter—may seem like a category of wrongdoing that is now more or less
defunct. But the generative insight at the heart of the Fordice opinion is the
traceability of current practices to their predecessors—the link between
contemporary, superficially neutral policies and previous iterations in which the
discriminatory intent was apparent on the surface.240 This principle may not
function in the same way in other contexts, depending on the nature of the
original misconduct. But there is no logical reason that the historically
contextualized approach manifested in Fordice is limited to school
desegregation. We should not confuse the limited attention it has been given
with the analytical breadth of its potential. Its burden-shifting approach, had it
239. In this regard, Fordice built on previous case law imposing an “affirmative duty” on states to
desegregate. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968).
240. While it might seem to require categorically different treatment, the role of de jure
segregation in the Fordice opinion has an analogue in other, more contemporary areas of constitutional
struggle, which we can better understand by breaking the analysis into composite steps. Public
education in Mississippi was at one time segregated not merely by custom but by force of law. Those
laws were facially discriminatory, in a way that is admittedly different from most of what we see now,
but that does not limit the analytical reach. As has been established repeatedly, in cases like Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), and others, a facially neutral law with both discriminatory intent and impact likewise violates
the Equal Protection Clause—those policies are also de jure because they use the force of law to
discriminate. Facially neutral laws that are motivated by invidious intent “are just as abhorrent, and
just as unconstitutional, as laws that expressly discriminate on the basis of race.” N.C. State Conf. of
the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1976)). The difference is that facially neutral laws,
because of the lawmakers’ effort to bury any illicit intent, are susceptible to more dispute about their
validity than laws that openly discriminate on the basis of race or other proscribed category. But in our
specific context, that difference matters far less because we are concerned with previous laws that have
been already determined to be unconstitutional. North Carolina’s 2013 omnibus voting law, for example,
was conclusively invalidated on the basis of its discriminatory intent and disparate impact—it can be
considered functionally analogous to the kind of equal protection violation that is easy to identify in
de jure segregation policies. See id. at 219.
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been more widely adopted, might have transformed the litigation of iterative
lawmaking.
Few courts or commentators have understood Fordice to reach beyond the
particular context of race-based policies in public education.241 But echoes of its
traceability insight appear in more recent opinions and in contexts beyond
school desegregation. Considering an Establishment Clause challenge to a series
of Ten Commandments displays in McCreary, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that “reasonable observers have reasonable memories,” refusing
“to turn a blind eye to the context in which [a] policy arose.”242
C.

McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky: Reasonable Observers Have
Reasonable Memories

A detailed account of McCreary’s procedural history illustrates how
decisively the Supreme Court embraced an intent analysis that was sensitive to

241. It has only been cited eight times in Supreme Court opinions, two of those by Justice
Sotomayor—in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1410 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), and in
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2439 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The appellate courts have
mostly refused to apply Fordice outside the context of education—an analysis of every Fordice citation
in the federal courts of appeals reveals not only that the application of its burden-shifting framework
is limited primarily to school desegregation matters, but that courts have explicitly rejected its
application to other matters. See, e.g., Knight v. Alabama, 476 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a challenge to a tax scheme and school finance policy was not subject to Fordice framework); Burton
v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1190 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a challenge to an annexation
decision affecting voting rights was not subject to Fordice); I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1286 n.7
(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a challenge to a tax scheme and school finance policy was not subject to
Fordice framework); Johnson v. DeSoto Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 204 F.3d 1335, 1344 n.18 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding that a challenge to at-large elections was not subject to Fordice framework). Excluding
the cases in which Fordice was cited for unrelated propositions—such as the retroactivity of a statute or
the existence of a private right of action—the research revealed twenty-seven cases in which the
traceability principle was considered potentially applicable, and only five of them were in contexts
outside of school desegregation. See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 402 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005)
(challenging racial segregation in housing); Rutherford v. City of Cleveland, 179 F. App’x 366, 367–
68 (6th Cir. 2006) (challenging a police department’s affirmative action program); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1225–27 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (considering and rejecting
traceability in a challenge to felon disenfranchisement, while expressing reluctance to apply Fordice
outside of the education context); Hall v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 326 F.3d 1157, 1171–73 (11th Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (challenging the appointment of a superintendent); Ensley Branch, NAACP v.
Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1575–77 (11th Cir. 1994) (challenging a fire and police department’s affirmative
action program). In none of these five cases were the challengers successful in persuading the court to
shift the burden. Notably, the Fordice framework was also applied outside the school desegregation
context in two additional panel opinions that were vacated en banc. Harness v. Hosemann, 988 F.3d
818, 820, 821 n.3 (5th Cir.) (challenging felon disenfranchisement), rev’d en banc, 2 F.4th 501 (5th Cir.
2021) (per curiam); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1291, 1298–300 (11th Cir. 2003)
(challenging felon disenfranchisement), rev’d en banc, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004) (mem.). In one
additional case, an appeals court reversed a district court ruling that had relied on Fordice in a voting
rights case—the Fourth Circuit opinion considered extensively in Section II.E.
242. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000)).
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history and context, firmly rejecting the idea that only the last in a series of
government actions should be considered. At issue in McCreary was the display
of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky county courthouses.243 The
displays changed form three times within a year as they were repeatedly
challenged in federal court for violating the Establishment Clause.244 By the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, the question was not only whether
the counties’ purpose was a proper basis upon which to evaluate the legitimacy
of the display, but also “whether evaluation of the counties’ claim of secular
purpose for the ultimate displays may take their evolution into account.”245 The
Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, holding that “the development of
the presentation should be considered when determining its purpose.”246
The controversy began in the summer of 1999, when officials in McCreary
and Pulaski Counties displayed in their respective courthouses large, goldframed excerpts of the King James version of the Ten Commandments.247 The
ACLU sued the counties, asserting that the displays violated the Establishment
Clause and seeking a preliminary injunction against their maintenance.248
Within a month, and before the district court ruled on the preliminary
injunction, the legislative bodies of both counties enacted resolutions
authorizing expanded displays and explaining that the Ten Commandments
constitute “the precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal codes
of . . . Kentucky are founded.”249 The resolutions offered a variety of
observations in support of the displays, including that in 1993 the Kentucky
House of Representatives voted unanimously to adjourn “in remembrance and
honor of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Ethics” and that the “Founding Father[s
had an] explicit understanding of the duty of elected officials to publicly
acknowledge God as the source of America’s strength and direction.”250 In the
second version of the display, copies of this resolution were posted alongside
the framed Ten Commandments.251 Unlike the first version, the new display
also included eight smaller documents containing religious themes or excerpts
to emphasize religious elements.252

243. Id. at 850.
244. Id.
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 850–51.
247. Id. at 851.
248. Id. at 852.
249. Id. at 852–53.
250. Id. at 853.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 853–54. The documents included, among others, the “endowed by their Creator”
passage from the Declaration of Independence and the national motto, “In God We Trust.” Id. at 854.
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Applying the Lemon v. Kurtzman253 test for evaluating Establishment
Clause claims, the district court found that both the first and second versions
of the display lacked any secular purpose.254 Rejecting the counties’ argument
that the displays were meant to be educational, the district court noted that the
“narrow scope” of the first display—“a single religious text unaccompanied by
any interpretation explaining its role as a foundational document—can hardly
be said to present meaningfully the story of this country’s religious
traditions.”255 As for the second version, the district court observed that the
counties had “narrowly tailored” the “selection of foundational documents to
incorporate only those with specific references to Christianity.”256 The district
court entered a preliminary injunction, ordering that the displays be removed
immediately and that no county official “erect or cause to be erected similar
displays.”257
The counties appealed from the preliminary injunction but then
voluntarily dismissed the appeal after hiring new lawyers.258 Without repealing
the resolutions that authorized the previous display, the counties installed yet a
third version of the display.259 The third version consisted of nine documents
of equal size, one of them explicitly identified as the King James version of the
Ten Commandments, now quoted at greater length than before.260
Accompanying the Commandments were framed copies of the Magna Carta,
the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the “StarSpangled Banner,” the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble
to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice.261 Each document
came with a statement about its historical and legal significance, and the
collection was titled “The Foundations of American Law and Government
Display.”262
At the plaintiffs’ request, the district court supplemented the preliminary
injunction to include the third display, reiterating the religious nature of the
first and second versions and finding that the counties’ purpose continued to be
253. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
254. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 854–55. The test is: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Lemon, 403
U.S. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
255. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 854.
256. Id. at 854–55.
257. Id. at 854.
258. Id. at 855.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 856.
262. Id. Included in the statement explaining the significance of the Ten Commandments was the
proposition that they “provide the moral background of the Declaration of Independence and the
foundation of our legal tradition.” Id.
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religious rather than secular.263 The Sixth Circuit affirmed264 over a dissenting
opinion that disputed the relevance of the prior displays and asserted “that a
history of unconstitutional displays can[not] be used as a sword to strike down
an otherwise constitutional display.”265
The Supreme Court affirmed, expressly endorsing the consideration of the
entire sequence of the counties’ actions and reactions.266 Writing for the
majority, Justice Souter declined the counties’ exhortations to apply “a standard
oblivious to the history of religious government action like the progression of
exhibits in this case.”267 The majority reiterated that judicial inquiry into
whether a challenged government action had a secular legislative purpose
remained an important part of Establishment Clause analysis because the
Clause’s core principle of official religious neutrality is violated when
government acts with the purpose of advancing religion.268 This assessment of
purpose is undertaken not by the folly of attempting “judicial psychoanalysis of
a drafter’s heart of hearts,” but by adopting the stance of an “objective observer”
who takes into account “traditional external signs that show up in the ‘text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute,’ or comparable official
act.”269
On that foundation, the Supreme Court considered the counties’
argument “that purpose in a case like this one should be inferred, if at all, only
from the latest news about the last in a series of governmental actions, however
close they may all be in time and subject.”270 The Supreme Court firmly rejected
this approach, observing that “the world is not made brand new every morning,
and the Counties are simply asking us to ignore perfectly probative evidence;
they want an absentminded objective observer, not one presumed to be familiar
with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn what
history has to show.”271 The Supreme Court concluded that the counties’
proposed method “just bucks common sense: reasonable observers have
reasonable memories, and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to turn a
blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose.’”272 Examining all three

263. Id. at 856–57.
264. Id. at 857.
265. ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438, 478 (6th Cir. 2003) (Ryan, J., dissenting),
aff’d, 545 U.S. 844.
266. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850–51.
267. Id. at 859.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 862 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
270. Id. at 866.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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installations and the surrounding circumstances in its assessment of religious
purpose, the Court upheld the preliminary injunction.273
While Fordice spoke in the proceduralist register of burden-shifting,
McCreary speaks in the intuitive language of common sense—a beloved but less
reliable instrument than burden-shifting, at least insofar as constitutional
litigation is concerned. But both of these opinions confirm that a government
defendant’s latest effort cannot be examined in isolation, and that the
constitutionality of the most recent version depends on a holistic assessment of
the entire chronology that preceded it. Although McCreary does not follow
Fordice in explicitly imposing a burden on government defendants, it
nonetheless subtly expresses the idea that government defendants must account
for the link between the latest iteration and previous conduct, rather than
expecting the slate to be wiped clean between each cycle. The idea that
“reasonable observers have reasonable memories”274 continues to express, in its
own powerful way, the traceability concept set out in Fordice. The lesson is clear,
and McCreary’s influence has been notable—at least in the Establishment
Clause context, lower courts have acknowledged that “as we have learned from
McCreary County, history and context matter in these cases.”275
The insight is uncontroversial at that level of generality, and the Supreme
Court has certainly never disavowed it. But in Abbott v. Perez, a 2018 case arising
out of an intricate and prolonged series of challenges to redistricting plans in
Texas, the Court admonished the lower court for placing excessive emphasis on
the history of discriminatory intent leading up to the plan most recently at
issue.276 It was “fundamental legal error,” the Court chastised, for the lower
court to require the state to provide evidence that it cured the discriminatory
273. Id. at 881. As noteworthy as the McCreary opinion is standing alone, its importance for our
purposes is further underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court decided another Ten
Commandments case the very same day, in which it upheld the display as constitutionally permissible.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005). The main difference between the cases was the
sequence of events leading up to the litigation—the display in Van Orden had been standing for forty
years without legal dispute. Id. at 746 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer voted to uphold the display
in Van Orden and strike down the display in McCreary, making him the only Justice to vote differently
on the two cases. He explained that the years of tranquility in Van Orden showed that “few individuals,
whatever their system of beliefs, [we]re likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in any
significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to
promote religion over nonreligion.” Id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). According to
Justice Breyer, this differed in a “determinative” way from McCreary, “where the short (and stormy)
history of the courthouse Commandments’ displays demonstrates the substantially religious objectives
of those who mounted them.” Id. at 702–03.
274. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
275. ACLU of Ky. v. Garrard County, 517 F. Supp. 2d 925, 928, 941 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (identifying
the central question: “If a county gets it wrong in displaying the Ten Commandments, what does it
then take to get it ‘right’ such that it passes constitutional muster?”); see also Felix v. City of Bloomfield,
841 F.3d 848, 862 (10th Cir. 2016) (relying on McCreary to assess whether a reasonable observer would
discern religious purpose).
276. 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313.
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taint of a prior redistricting plan.277 The legislature was entitled to a
presumption of good faith, the Court instructed, and it was the challengers’
burden to show the existence of discriminatory intent specific to the latest
challenge.278
D.

Abbott v. Perez: The Presumption of Legislative Good Faith Is Renewable

For all its procedural complexity, at the center of Abbott was this core
question: Once a voting district is drawn with discriminatory intent and
therefore invalidated, under what circumstances can a district with those same
lines reappear in later redistricting plans? Texas, its population having grown
by more than twenty percent, was apportioned four new congressional seats
after the 2010 census.279 The redistricting plans drawn in 2011 to reflect these
changes were immediately challenged in federal court on the grounds that the
new districts were racial gerrymanders, produced intentional vote dilution, and
had the effect of depriving minority voters an equal opportunity to elect the
candidates of their choice.280 In a parallel proceeding initiated by the State to
fulfill its preclearance obligations under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, still
in force at the time, the 2011 plans were denied preclearance because the map
had “retrogressive effect” and “was enacted with discriminatory intent.”281 The
2011 plan was then repealed by the Texas legislature in 2013.282
In its place, the legislature enacted a new redistricting plan that was very
closely modeled on an interim plan drawn by the three-judge district court to
which the 2011 challenge had been assigned.283 That court faced the “unwelcome
obligation” of drawing an interim plan for Texas to use in the 2012 primaries
because the legislature’s 2011 plan did not receive preclearance and election
deadlines were fast approaching.284 The lower court’s first interim plan was
vacated by the Supreme Court for failing to reflect sufficient deference to the
state legislature.285 The Supreme Court instructed the district court to start with
the 2011 plan adopted by the legislature and then adjust it as necessary to avoid
legal defects.286 On remand, the lower court drew a revised, “more deferential
interim plan[], but noted that its analysis had been expedited and curtailed, and
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2324.
279. Id. at 2314.
280. Id. at 2315.
281. Id. at 2345 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Texas obtained a vacatur of this decision after being
released from its preclearance obligations in Shelby County v. Holder. Id. at 2317 (majority opinion).
282. Id.
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (“A district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an
action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the
apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”).
284. Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2345 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
285. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 397–99 (2012) (per curiam).
286. Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2313.
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that it had only made preliminary conclusions that might be revised on full
consideration.”287 It was this revised interim plan, designed for use in the
exigent circumstances presented by an election rapidly approaching without a
usable map, that was used as the model for the redistricting plan enacted by the
2013 legislature.288
By spring 2017, the lower court held multiple trials on both the 2011 and
2013 plans.289 The district court found that the 2011 plan was unlawful because
it created districts that were impermissible racial gerrymanders that would
intentionally dilute minority voting strength.290 Turning its attention to the
2013 redistricting plan, which unlike the 2011 plan had actually gone into effect
and was used in two intervening elections, the district court invalidated those
districts in the 2013 plan that corresponded to the 2011 plan.291 The court noted
that the 2011 plan in which those districts were first drawn was infected by
discriminatory intent, and the legislature failed to “engage in a deliberative
process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011 plans.”292
The Supreme Court reversed this ruling, treating it as an inversion of the
burden of proof and a failure to comply with a “presumption of legislative good
faith.”293 The majority reiterated that “[w]henever a challenger claims that a
state law was enacted with discriminatory intent, the burden of proof lies with
the challenger, not the State.”294 Essential for our purposes, the Court cautioned
that a finding of past discrimination is not sufficient to change “[t]he allocation
of the burden of proof and the presumption of legislative good faith . . . . ‘[P]ast
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental
action that is not itself unlawful.’”295 The Court acknowledged that “[t]he
‘historical background’ of a legislative enactment is ‘one evidentiary source’
relevant to the question of intent,” citing Arlington Heights.296 But it cautioned
that “we have never suggested that past discrimination flips the evidentiary
burden on its head.”297
287. Id. at 2345 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 2317 (majority opinion) (noting that the legislature “enacted the Texas court’s interim
plans with just a few minor changes”).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2313. Unlike the 2011 plan, the 2013 plan had in fact been used in both the 2014 and
2016 elections. Id. at 2317.
292. Id. at 2318.
293. Id. at 2326–27.
294. Id. at 2324.
295. Id. It took the “original sin” language from a plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 74 (1980), a decision that Congress repudiated by amending the Voting Rights Act to specify
that violations could be proven by discriminatory impact alone. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35
(1986).
296. Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2325 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)).
297. Id.
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Leaving aside for the moment whether the Court had suggested just that
in Fordice, we must first take note of the dissent’s strong objection to this
characterization of the lower court’s analysis.298 The dissenting Justices insisted
that the district court, rather than relying on a mechanistic transfer of intent
from the 2011 legislature to the 2013 legislature, “followed the guidance in
Arlington Heights virtually to a tee.”299 The dissent painstakingly worked through
each of the factors shaping the district court’s conclusion, noting the ways in
which it was supported by demonstrated discriminatory impact as well as
oddities in the deliberative process.300
What emerges from the dissent is something that is difficult to discern in
the majority opinion and particularly relevant for our purposes: the strength of
the connective tissue making the 2013 plan inseverable from the 2011 plan. To
see this, it helps to recap the entire history in highly simplified form: First, the
2011 plan was challenged by plaintiffs as tainted by discriminatory intent and
concurrently denied preclearance.301 To provide a usable map for the 2012
election, the lower court then produced an interim plan only to have it rejected
by the Supreme Court, which told the lower court to start with the 2011 plan
and make any adjustments necessary to eliminate legal defects.302 Next, the
lower court followed this instruction but cautioned that its analysis was
provisional.303 Lastly, the legislature adopted the revised interim 2012 plan as
the 2013 plan.304 The dissent succinctly articulated that ultimately, in adopting
the 2013 plan, “[t]he Legislature made no substantive changes to the challenged
districts that were the subject of the 2011 complaints.”305 Moreover, the dissent
observed, there was “substantial evidence” that the 2013 Legislature’s approval
of the interim plans was part of a strategy “to insulate (and thus continue to
benefit from) the discriminatory taint of its 2011 maps.”306
The majority opinion emphasized the amount of judicial review to which
the plan was subjected over the course of this history, scoffing at the idea that

298. “The Court today goes out of its way to permit the State of Texas to use maps that the threejudge District Court unanimously found were adopted for the purpose of preserving the racial
discrimination that tainted its previous maps.” Id. at 2335 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 2346.
300. Id. at 2335–49.
301. Id. at 2315–16 (majority opinion).
302. Id.
303. See id. at 2316.
304. Id. at 2317.
305. Id. at 2347–48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 2348. Explaining this in further detail, the dissent noted that the Texas Attorney
General had predrafted the legislative findings asserting that the 2012 plan complied with all applicable
law, before any actual fact-finding had been done, and “advised the Legislature that adopting the
interim plans was the ‘best way to avoid further intervention from federal judges’ and to ‘insulate
[Texas’] redistricting plans from further legal challenge.’” Id. at 2348–49.
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the plan could nonetheless continue to have unconstitutional remnants.307 This
may be an appealing proposition at first blush because the “rather convoluted”
procedural history of this case did provide considerably more judicial input than
is often the case for challenged lawmaking.308 By the time the state legislature
was preparing to adopt the 2013 map, the plan under consideration was the
product of two rounds of review at the district court level and one round at the
Supreme Court.309 But the weight the majority placed on this becomes less
convincing once we consider the district court’s factfinding regarding the effect
of all this input. In 2012, issuing the interim map that derived from the 2011
plan and would eventually become the 2013 plan, the district court warned that
the conclusions were “preliminary,” had been subject to “severe time
constraints,” and “were not based on a full examination of the record or the
governing law.”310 The district court also explained that the “claims
presented . . . involve difficult and unsettled legal issues as well as numerous
factual disputes,” and that its conclusions were therefore subject to further
revision before any determinations became final.311 In 2017, when it finally
undertook the full trial on the 2011 and 2013 plans, the district court determined
that its own involvement in creating the 2012 interim plan was insufficient to
break the link between the 2013 plan and the discriminatory intent of the 2011
map.312
The dissent lamented the majority’s refusal to credit the district court’s
finding that the “Legislature in 2013 intentionally furthered and continued the
existing discrimination in the plans.”313 But the Abbott dissenters also drew
attention to the fact “that the majority does not question the relevance of
historical discrimination in assessing present discriminatory intent.”314 As the
dissent noted,
[T]he majority leaves undisturbed the longstanding principle recognized
in Arlington Heights that the “‘historical background’ of a legislative
enactment is ‘one evidentiary source’ relevant to the question of intent.”
With respect to these cases, the majority explicitly acknowledges that, in
evaluating whether the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory
purpose, “the intent of the 2011 Legislature . . . [is] relevant” and “must

307. The majority constantly referred to the disputed map as “court-ordered,” “court-issued,” or
“court-approved.” See id. at 2316, 2327–29 (majority opinion).
308. Id. at 2345 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 2328 (majority opinion).
310. Id. at 2348 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2318 (majority opinion).
313. Id. at 2349 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 2351.
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be weighed together with any other direct and circumstantial evidence”
bearing on intent.315
One could thus potentially read Abbott as both the majority and dissent
urge us to do: a dispute over the proper application of long-standing principles
from Arlington Heights that are uncontroversial in the abstract. But to do so is to
elide the lessons that can be drawn by viewing Abbott as part of a trajectory that
includes not only Arlington Heights, but also Fordice and McCreary. Analyzing
these precedents interdoctrinally, we see what is effectively a complete reversal
in the Supreme Court’s approach to iterative lawmaking. In Abbott, the
dissenting Justices did not openly defend a burden-shifting approach as an
appropriate method of resolving a challenge to successive lawmaking; instead,
they endeavored to repudiate the majority’s charge that the district court shifted
the burden of proof.316 But looking back to Fordice, it is clear that the Supreme
Court was at one time expressly willing to shift the burden to the state to prove
that a challenged policy was not a remnant of prior unconstitutional conduct.317
And even McCreary’s softer and more colloquial expression that “the world is
not made brand new every morning”318 exists in some tension with the notion
of an infinitely renewable presumption of good faith that the district court is
required to apply in full on each successive round of revisions.
One might query whether the error is in trying to find connection across
these three cases—should we not simply view Fordice as applicable to school
desegregation, while McCreary governs Establishment Clause litigation and
Abbott controls voting rights? Although it may be tempting to leave Fordice,
McCreary, and Abbott each in their own substantive silos, the methodological
tensions between them cannot be fully resolved by reference to the doctrinal
differences that distinguish each of these cases. Although the rights at stake in
each context differ considerably, in order to apply the requisite substantive
principles, the Court must consider essentially the same question: How much
does the past matter? How do we know that the past is really past? The
inescapably interdoctrinal nature of this inquiry is revealed in the fact that both
the Abbott majority and dissent cite to Arlington Heights, which is now well
established as an authority that transcends substantive doctrinal areas.319
315. Id. at 2351–52 (citation omitted).
316. See id. at 2335–36.
317. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text.
318. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005).
319. Arlington Heights was a case alleging racial discrimination in housing. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254 (1977). It cited a case about an alleged
retaliatory discharge of a public employee for engaging in protected speech. Id. at 270–71 n.21 (citing
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977)). It was then prominently
adopted in a case concerning religious liberty. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (adopting Mt. Healthy). This area of inquiry has been interdoctrinal
since its inception. In accounting for the unexplained obsolescence of Fordice, there may be a temptation
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The more convincing explanation is simply that the Court is growing
impatient with the historically sensitive approach on display in Fordice and is
ready to imagine that the world, if not made brand new every morning, is best
captured by a presumption of good faith that refreshes continuously no matter
how many rounds have transpired. The possibility that Abbott reflects an
unspoken departure from Fordice and McCreary is troubling for reasons apparent
in the ongoing dispute over voter ID requirements in North Carolina. As we
see in the next section, recent developments in that controversy afford a glimpse
into a future in which sensitivity to historical context is viewed with skepticism
and derided as a judicial variant on the concept of original sin.
E.

Abbott Applied and Gone Astray

As 2020 sputtered to its long-awaited finish, the Fourth Circuit relied
heavily on Abbott in reversing the preliminary injunction that was issued against
North Carolina’s 2018 voter ID law, concluding that the district court accorded
too much weight to the discriminatory intent that invalidated the prior version
of the law.320 Recall that the 2013 version was found to target Black voters with
“surgical precision” and that the 2018 law was enacted as its successor.321 As the
Fourth Circuit put it, in analyzing the 2018 law, “The outcome hinges on the
answer to a simple question: How much does the past matter?”322 Its answer:
not as much as the district court thought. The appellate court criticized the
district court for treating “the North Carolina General Assembly’s recent
discriminatory past” as “effectively dispositive” of the validity of the 2018
law.323 “[T]he Supreme Court directs differently,” instructed the Fourth
Circuit, citing Abbott v. Perez.324
In the context of North Carolina’s history of voter suppression, “recent
discriminatory past” is a hardworking phrase.325 Applied to the relevant
to note that case’s origin in manifest de jure racial segregation, and to note that Fordice is progeny of
Brown v. Board of Education, a pedigree lacking in other contexts. But the Arlington Heights inquiry was
never offered as a framework meant to apply to “lesser” forms of unconstitutional conduct as compared
to the de jure segregation at issue in Fordice. The Arlington Heights framework was designed to ferret
out when other forms of state action are equivalently unconstitutional in substance despite their
superficially neutral form. Arlington Heights itself cited to cases that were part of the Brown progeny,
such as school districts in Virginia shutting down rather than integrating, and then providing for white
students to attend private schools. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text. The idea that Fordice
is part of a separate genealogy breaks down on inspection.
320. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 311 (4th Cir. 2020).
321. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
322. Raymond, 981 F.3d at 298.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468–69 (2017) (affirming the lower court’s
invalidation of a racial gerrymander because “uncontested evidence” showed that the state’s mapmakers
“purposefully established a racial target: African-Americans should make up no less than a majority of
the voting-age population” and exhibited “a ‘textbook example’ of race-based redistricting”).
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chronology, it seems we are to accept that the discriminatory motive infecting
the 2013 law became “past” in May 2017, when the Supreme Court declined the
State’s petition for certiorari, leaving in place the appellate court’s judgment
that the law was unconstitutional.326 A few hours later, when North Carolina
lawmakers began “calling for a new law that would incorporate some of the same
ideas,” ushering in the process that culminated in the 2018 law, the “present”
had already begun.327 Having thus established that whatever led to the
discriminatory 2013 law was “past,” the Fourth Circuit drew the following
lesson from Abbott:
A legislature’s past acts do not condemn the acts of a later legislature,
which we must presume acts in good faith. So because we find that the
district court improperly disregarded this principle by reversing the
burden of proof and failing to apply the presumption of legislative good
faith, we reverse.328
Throughout its opinion, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Abbott
without ever accounting for its key distinguishing feature: the extensive judicial
involvement in the Texas redistricting plans that were ultimately at issue.329
This is profoundly misguided. Abbott’s repeated insistence on a fully renewed
presumption of legislative good faith must be viewed in light of the unusual fact
that the lower court participated, albeit in an admittedly constrained way, in
drawing the map that it later invalidated.330 But notwithstanding its misuse,
Abbott’s impact is nonetheless unmistakable. It offers the readily available frame
of impermissible burden-shifting whenever a lower court seeks to trace
invidious intent through multiple rounds of lawmaking. Any effort to see
whether lawmakers have “purged the ‘taint’” of a demonstrated prior purpose is
now at risk of being reversed as an improper flip of the burden.331
This is troubling for many reasons. First, undertaking a traceability
analysis to uncover lingering invidious purpose is distinct from the question of
which party bears the burden. Identifying a discriminatory taint, and then
seeking to assess whether it was purged at a later point, is not itself tantamount
to burden-shifting: either party can bear the burden in a traceability analysis.
In keeping with the ordinary approach in constitutional litigation,332 it may well
326. Raymond, 981 F.3d at 299.
327. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 26–27 (M.D.N.C. 2019),
rev’d sub nom. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295.
328. Raymond, 981 F.3d at 298 (citation omitted).
329. Id. at 303–05.
330. See supra Section II.D.
331. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–25 (2018); Raymond, 981 F.3d at 304.
332. Whenever a challenger claims that a state law was enacted with discriminatory intent, the
burden of proof lies with the challenger, not the state. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 520 U.S.
471, 481 (1997). For a discussion of cases in which the Supreme Court has appeared skeptical of
“whether the state’s record can be believed as a complete and unbiased presentation of evidence,” see
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be the challenger who has the burden to show that the state’s latest effort is
traceable to the earlier one. If the challengers meet their burden to show
traceability, then the district court could conclude, without ever “flipping the
burden,” that lawmakers did not purge the taint.
In the alternative, we can imagine a revival of the Fordice approach: that
“given an initially tainted policy,” the state will subsequently have the burden
to show that the taint was purged, and that its latest product is not traceable to
its earlier invalid efforts.333 This approach is clearly at odds with the current
Supreme Court’s inclination,334 but as we have seen, the Court did at one point
explicitly conduct such analysis.335 Abbott and its progeny are thus troubling for
another reason: what appears to be the functional repudiation of Fordice
warrants more than just sub silentio treatment. Ruling against North Carolina’s
2018 voter identification law, the district court relied on Fordice for the
proposition that “[i]t therefore seems ‘eminently reasonable to make the State
bear the risk of nonpersuasion with respect to intent’ when the very same people
who passed the old, unconstitutional law passed the new.”336 The Fourth Circuit
does not address why this reliance on Fordice was improper, other than to
continually invoke Abbott as if it were self-evidently superseding.337 The Abbott
majority, for its part, does not mention Fordice at all, much less explain how its
core insight became so disfavored.338 In sum, the Court has offered no
explanation for how burden-shifting went from an accepted method for
adjudicating the longevity of impermissible intent to a shorthand for reversible
error in the context of iterative lawmaking.

Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative
Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2031–32 (2014).
333. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 746–47 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Professor
Murray proposes a decision rule under which “[a] tainted relationship is prima facie evidence that
justifies shifting a burden of production to the government of demonstrating the taint’s extirpation.”
Murray, supra note 24, at 1237; see also Gabriel J. Chin, Rehabilitating Unconstitutional Statutes: An
Analysis of Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998), 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 421, 435 (2002)
(scrutinizing the argument that an initially unconstitutional statute can be legitimated by the action of
a subsequent legislature and offering various criteria to analyze “what circumstances should be
sufficient to warrant a finding that the taint has been purged”).
334. Eyer, The New Jim Crow, supra note 11, at 1072 (observing in passing that Abbott appears to
reject a burden-shifting approach but explaining that “[w]here a law initially was enacted for the
purposes of racial subordination, in most circumstances the race of those initially burdened by the law
is still a cause (and typically a ‘but for’ cause) of the contemporary statute’s existence”).
335. See supra Section II.B.
336. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 32 (M.D.N.C. 2019), rev’d
sub nom. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295.
337. Raymond, 981 F.3d passim.
338. Justice Alito, the author of Abbott, might have heeded his own prior exhortation that “[a]
precedent of this Court should not be treated like a disposable household item—say, a paper plate or
napkin—to be used once and then tossed in the trash.” Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1486 (2017)
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Nor is there a sufficient explanation in Abbott’s constant reminder that
courts must apply a presumption of legislative good faith.339 As a starting point,
there was some artful maneuvering in the majority’s treatment of this
supposedly established principle. In the case that Abbott cites as authority for
the presumption of legislative good faith, the full proposition is this: “Although
race-based decisionmaking is inherently suspect, until a claimant makes a
showing sufficient to support that allegation the good faith of a state legislature
must be presumed.”340
This additional context illustrates Professor Richard Hasen’s point that
the presumption embraced in Abbott was not only “new” but “appears to have
been created via distortion of an earlier racial gerrymandering case.”341 Putting
this doubtful pedigree aside, however, the fact remains that invoking a
presumption of legislative good faith does little to answer the key questions that
arise in successive lawmaking. The presumption of legislative good faith that
the Abbott majority appears to contemplate is not a conclusive one,342 at least
not transparently so.343 The central remaining question is whether any such
presumption is rebuttable by previous displays of invidious intent.344
339. See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–26 (2018).
340. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (citations omitted).
341. Hasen, supra note 29, at 64.
342. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of
Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 307–08 (1920) (“[T]here is no class of case more confused or confusing,
more difficult to analyze or rationalise, than those which deal with the effect of presumptions on the
burden of proof.”); James Fleming, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 51 (1961) (“The term ‘burden
of proof’ is used in our law to refer to two separate and quite different concepts.”); Edmund M.
Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. & ST. BAR J. 255, 255 (1937) (“Every writer of sufficient
intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of
presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair.”).
343. Scholars have started to express skepticism about the Supreme Court’s own good faith on
matters at the intersection of race and political power. As Professor Hasen has argued, the Court’s clear
pro-partisan turn is making it more difficult to avoid the conclusion that it is complicit in allowing
“political actors freer range to pass laws and enact policies that can help entrench politicians—
particularly Republicans—in power and insulate them from political competition.” Hasen, supra note
29, at 50. Professor Hasen suggests that the Supreme Court consider “what an intelligent person is
going to conclude about the Supreme Court if the five Republican-appointed Justices continue to side
with Republicans in redistricting and voting rights disputes by using new tools that load the dice in
favor of partisan political actions.” Id. at 79; see also Klarman, supra note 199, at 224, 231 (describing
how the Supreme Court has repeatedly “defended the interests of the Republican Party” rather than
protecting democracy); Manheim & Porter, supra note 13, at 230; Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy and
Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
1565, 1570 (2013) (arguing that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts reflected “a cynical conception of
politics” in which “the discrete and insular minorities that were once entitled to protection under the
defective pluralism conception of politics became the object of suspicion”).
344. There appears to be an analogue in the review of executive decision-making. “The
presumption of regularity is a deference doctrine: it credits to the executive branch certain facts about
what happened and why and, in doing so, narrows judicial scrutiny and widens executive discretion
over decisionmaking processes and outcomes.” Note, The Presumption of Regularity in Judicial Review of
the Executive Branch, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2431, 2432 (2018).
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It requires little effort to frame the lower court opinions in Abbott and the
North Carolina voter ID case as concluding that the presumption of legislative
good faith was in fact rebutted. To add a bit more texture, we could characterize
those rulings as having applied a presumption that does not refresh in full every
time the Texas Legislature and the North Carolina General Assembly go back
to the drawing board to regulate elections following defeat in federal court. If
this refusal to refresh the presumption in full is what the Supreme Court finds
to be “fundamental legal error,” then the Court is headed into some truly
indefensible territory.345
To invoke the presumption as if it makes no difference whether it is being
applied on the first, second, or third round of lawmaking starts to look like
something rather different than a presumption, suggesting instead a naiveté that
is neither compelled nor permitted by the constitutional doctrines that form the
substantive frameworks for these disputes.346 Renewing the presumption of
legislative good faith in full on each round amounts to an accretion of deference
that threatens to hollow out from within the substantive principles the plaintiffs
seek to vindicate.347
It has never been easy for plaintiffs to vindicate claims that their
constitutional rights have been violated, and the Supreme Court has rightfully
been criticized at length for closing the door on all but the most obvious forms
of state-sponsored discrimination.348 But cases like Fordice and McCreary reveal
that the Court was, for a time, at least reluctant to close its eyes to the obvious.
It has been eighty years since the Court announced that the Equal Protection
Clause is offended by “sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination.”349 Free speech doctrine likewise “comprises a series of tools to
flush out illicit motives,” such as government hostility to a speaker’s message,
from superficially neutral regulation.350 The religion clauses similarly insist that
“[l]egislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to
345. See, e.g., Elise C. Boddie, The Contested Role of Time in Equal Protection, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1825, 1826 (2017) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s “assumptions that the effects of prior discrimination
expire, such that current inequality bears no cognizable relationship to discrimination from years past”).
346. Klarman, supra note 199, at 223 (“Judge Friendly . . . once famously said that ‘[j]udges are not
required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.’ . . . Constitutional law does not
require the Court to show such naiveté either. Indeed, well-established principles of equal protection
and free exercise do not permit such naiveté.”).
347. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903 (2016) (“Concerns
about the bad faith of public policymakers, then, undergird the elaboration and enforcement of
numerous antidiscrimination norms.”).
348. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Rights as a Zero-Sum Game, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 351, 356–57 (2019)
(describing the Supreme Court’s highly constrained view of unconstitutional discrimination and
gathering sources critiquing those limitations).
349. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939); Yuvraj Joshi, Racial Indirection, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 2495, 2501 (2019) (“[R]acial indirection describes practices with a covert racial form that have a
disproportionate racial impact.”).
350. Kagan, supra note 218, at 414; see also, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 164 (2015).
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persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.”351 These propositions, so well
settled that they hardly need reminder, are threatened by a presumption of good
faith that is infinitely renewable cycle after cycle. Given the persistence and
strategic adaptions of government defendants of the sort revealed in this
Article, courts cannot fairly examine sophisticated or disguised modes of
unconstitutional conduct if they are forbidden to draw inferences from prior
iterations of a challenged law.
A full course correction would return us to the insight highlighted in
Fordice: the latest iteration of a challenged policy may well be traceable to its
unconstitutional predecessors, and “given an initially tainted policy,” it should
be the state’s burden to show that the link has been severed.352 But at the very
least, the Court should retain the commonsense principles espoused in
McCreary, allowing “reasonable observers” to exercise their “reasonable
memories.”353 A tolerable universal principle of successive lawmaking simply
will not treat the second, third, or fourth attempt to withstand judicial review
as indistinguishable from the first. The next part considers several questions
and complexities we encounter as we build out from that foundational premise.
III. REFINING THE THEORY OF SUCCESSIVE LAWMAKING
We have now closely studied the multiphasal quality of constitutional
disputes across several different substantive areas. We have seen the extent to
which judicial treatment of the “recent discriminatory past” becomes outcome
determinative as lawmakers learn to conceal the defects that were fatal to prior
versions, and we have followed the troubling deterioration in the Supreme
Court’s willingness to trace the connection between subsequent iterations and
the original invalidated law. Applying an infinitely renewable presumption of
legislative good faith to second-bite lawmaking threatens to eviscerate
substantive principles that are fundamental to equal protection, free speech, and
religious liberty.
But additional questions emerge as we develop and refine a theory of
second-bite lawmaking and consider the appropriate mechanisms with which it
should be reviewed. What, if anything, might cut the thread between older,
invalidated policies and their newer iterations: Reenactment by a newly
constituted legislature, perhaps? Or merely the passage of time, at least when
combined with sufficient social transformation? Is there good iterative
lawmaking for which we might not condemn lawmakers who are trying to get
close to the constitutional line? Or, put differently, what does it look like when
351. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523, 547 (1993)
(emphasis added) (“The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or
practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions.”).
352. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 746–47 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
353. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005).

100 N.C. L. REV. 947 (2022)

1002

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

lawmakers are sincerely engaged in good faith interbranch dialogue about the
meaning and mechanics of constitutional law? Is there any way to develop a
typology that transcends political ideology? This part explores these questions
and offers some responses.
A.

What Cuts the Thread Between Old and New?
1. New Legislature, Clean Slate?

It is often the case that a subsequent iteration of an invalidated law is
enacted by a legislature that has undergone some change in membership. One
might be tempted to describe the second or third effort as having been enacted
by a “new” or “different” legislature, but to describe it as such obscures the
extent to which there may be substantial overlap in membership between the
legislative body that enacted the first version and the one responsible for
subsequent efforts.354 Our North Carolina case study illustrates this perfectly.
As the district court observed in its 2019 decision, “the same key legislators who
championed” the 2013 omnibus voting law “were the driving force behind” the
modified voting law enacted “just a few years later.”355 While it is crucial to
recognize this kind of continuity where it exists, the potential for significant
change in legislative membership from one session to another does raise an
important question for iterative lawmaking: How does it affect the connection
between the invalidated law and its successors, especially where intent is the
central inquiry? Is it not hard enough to discern legislative intent at a single
point in time, with a static group of legislators? How might we convincingly
say that the subsequent work product is traceable to its invalidated predecessor
when the personnel of the decision-making body has changed?
These questions are challenging, but also illustrate why it is important to
develop a sensible approach to successive lawmaking. We could get it wrong in
either direction—it is too extreme to say that a legislature never outruns the
taint of its differently constituted predecessor, but it is also problematic to
conclude that any new membership in the chamber itself wipes the slate clean.356
This is especially true for endeavors like restrictive voting measures, for which
354. In North Carolina, for example, “[l]egislative voting records reveal that, while the
composition of the General Assembly had changed somewhat in the time between 2013 and 2018, a
majority of the Republican legislators who voted for S.B. 824 had previously voted for H.B. 589.”
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 31 (M.D.N.C. 2019), rev’d sub nom.
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2020). “This fact is particularly
striking in light of Defendants’ admission that there were no ‘changes in legislative policy preferences
leading to the enactment of SB824.’” Id. at 32.
355. Id. at 35.
356. For a persuasive explanation of why turnover in multimember bodies is not sufficient in itself
to break the link between an earlier policy and a newer one, see Murray, supra note 24, at 1221 (“The
problems of evasion and the lingering effects of past wrongdoing do not disappear simply because
multimember bodies have inconstant personnel.”).
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support correlates so strongly with party affiliation that a new member of the
same party might well pick up the mantle of a prior impermissible effort with
little disruption or transformation in purpose.
To illustrate, we return once again to our case study of North Carolina
voting laws. Recall that the 2013 omnibus law targeting African Americans with
“surgical precision” passed along strict party lines, with all Republicans in favor
and all Democrats opposed.357 Now let’s consider a change in legislative
membership that takes place before the next round of voting legislation is
enacted. Depending on the type of change, there might be little reason to
conclude that the link to the prior invalid law has been severed. We can readily
envision a solidly Republican district where the Republican incumbent retired,
or was primaried, and a new Republican is elected to represent the district. The
prior member voted for the prior bill and the new member votes for the new
bill with the changes forced by the state’s loss in the previous litigation. Because
party affiliation in North Carolina is so predictive of support for the kind of
voting restrictions that disproportionately harm Black voters, the fact that there
is a new Republican in the seat should not itself be sufficient to discharge the
prior invidious purpose.358
But there might be a different dynamic in other scenarios. Ag-gag laws in
Iowa are supported by both Republicans and Democrats, either of whom might
have sufficiently close ties to the agricultural industry to be sympathetic to
legislation that seeks to protect the industry from criticism.359 The 2012 ag-gag
bill enacted in Iowa was voted up by all twenty-four Iowa Senate Republicans
as well as sixteen Iowa Senate Democrats, with ten Democrats voting against.360
Drawing from the context of this case study, we could imagine a district
represented by a Democrat who voted for the 2012 ag-gag law. If that Democrat
retires and is replaced by another Democrat whose ties to the agricultural
industry are of a different nature, we might have cause to wonder whether the
new Democrat shares the speech-suppressing motives of her predecessor. This
consideration would then be combined with an assessment of whether the
margin was such that this legislator’s support had any impact on the outcome
of the subsequent bill.

357. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d at 26, 35.
358. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 29, at 55–56.
359. Will Potter, “Ag Gag” Bills and Supporters Have Close Ties to ALEC, GREEN IS NEW RED (Apr.
26, 2012), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/ag-gag-american-legislative-exchange-council/59
47/ [https://perma.cc/7DNU-PLLD] (reporting that the Iowa Poultry Association helped draft Iowa’s
first ag-gag bill, that the bill’s “most vocal sponsor” was the former executive director of the Iowa Angus
Association, and that ag-gag “[s]upporters are quite proud of their ties to the agriculture industry”).
360. Iowa Senate Passes Two Bills Favored by Big Ag (Updated), BLEEDING HEARTLAND (Feb. 28,
2012), https://www.bleedingheartland.com/2012/02/28/iowa-senate-passes-two-bills-favored-by-bigag-updated/ [https://perma.cc/J5K3-2M98].
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In sum, an intervening election and a resulting change in legislative
membership may do little to disrupt the link between a newly challenged law
and its predecessor, or conversely, it may do quite a bit. A sensible approach to
second-bite lawmaking would certainly seek to distinguish reliably between
these possibilities, while accounting for the inferences that reasonably emerge
from the central fact that the subsequent effort shows sufficient resemblance to
a prior invalidated act to be considered a lineal descendant.361 The procedural
principle announced in Fordice—placing the burden on the state to show that
the link to a prior invalid policy has been severed—is well suited to
accommodate these diverse scenarios. In every instance of second-bite
lawmaking, the state is welcome to introduce evidence of changes in legislative
membership to show that the new effort is free of the impermissible intent that
infected the prior version. As the examples above illustrate, this may be
plausible in some scenarios and implausible in others; either way, it makes sense
to have this burden borne by the state, which has taken a second bite of the
lawmaking apple after suffering a defeat in constitutional litigation.
2. Passage of Time
While the seating of a newly constituted legislature may not itself be
sufficient to cut the thread, neither can we simply assume that invidious purpose
lingers indefinitely despite whatever transformations may have taken place in
the relevant social context. Take, for example, Sunday closing laws, which
“generally proscribe all labor, business and other commercial activities on
Sunday,” the “Sabbath day of the predominant Christian sects.”362 These laws
were undeniably of a “strongly religious origin,” enacted “in aid of the
established church.”363 The Supreme Court nonetheless upheld such laws
against Establishment Clause challenge in McGowan v. Maryland,364 explaining
that
[i]n light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the
centuries, and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular
considerations, it is not difficult to discern that as presently written and
administered, most of them, at least, are of a secular rather than of a
religious character, and that presently they bear no relationship to

361. Cf. Garrett, supra note 161, at 1479 (“[After lawmakers revise and reenact legislation,] courts
may be loath to trust their motives if they quickly claim to have re-done the policy, claiming newly
clean hands. The taint of constitutionally illegitimate intent may persist so long as the relevant action
is taken.”).
362. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 431 (1961).
363. Id. at 433. The “obvious precursor” of the statute under review in McGowan was titled “An
Act for the Service of Almighty God and the Establishment of the Protestant Religion within this
Province.” Id. at 446.
364. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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establishment of religion as those words are used in the Constitution of
the United States.365
The Court’s discussion of the history of Sunday closing laws began with
King Henry III in the thirteenth century and did not shy away from the
explicitly and incontrovertibly religious motives animating the original laws;
but the Court then painstakingly proceeded to trace how “the statutes began to
lose some of their totally religious flavor.”366 The need for a uniform day of rest
that laborers could share with their families and communities, and longstanding
social expectations that Sunday would be that day, provided sufficient secular
justification to support the law as a legitimate public policy independent of
religious purpose.367
McGowan provides an illustration of how a law can outlast its original
improper purpose, but we might wonder how instructive the lesson really is for
the sort of second-bite lawmaking with which we are primarily concerned. The
Sunday closing laws considered in McGowan were not actually successors to
laws that were struck down; they were not enacted in response to unfavorable
rulings and in order to withstand a subsequent round of judicial scrutiny. The
trajectory of Sunday closing laws thus does not include the information-forcing
mechanism of litigation and the strategic adaptions that government defendants
then undertake in response.368 But while this scenario presents a less compelling
need for a review framework tailored to the unique dynamics of second-bite
lawmaking, it nonetheless showcases the kind of factual inquiry that can yield a
persuasive conclusion that the link between a challenged law and an improper
purpose has been severed.
Whether we are considering formal developments, like the seating of a
new legislature, or gradual change, like the evolution of social meaning over
time, the important lesson is that a convincing approach to second-bite
lawmaking does not require us to set forth an all-purpose, preset typology
characterizing developments as either sufficient or insufficient to sever the link
365. Id. at 444.
366. Id. at 431–34.
367. Id. at 434–37.
368. For the same reason, the assessment of whether state provisions prohibiting government aid
to sectarian schools were motivated by anti-Catholic animus, at issue in Espinoza v. Montana Department
of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), is also somewhat orthogonal. Id. at 2251, 2273. It belongs in the
large general category of cases in which intent is constitutionally relevant and arguably discernable
from historical background, but does not present the issue of reenactment after invalidation. The role
of white supremacy in prompting states like Louisiana and Oregon to allow convictions by
nonunanimous juries is in a somewhat different posture. As explained in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390 (2020), at the time of those enactments, states had already begun to seek superficially race-neutral
means of maintaining white supremacy as a way to avoid equal protection constraints articulated by
the Supreme Court. Id. at 1394. Nonetheless, the context surrounding nonunanimous jury provisions
is also somewhat distinctive from the phenomenon we consider most closely here, where we can trace
a single trajectory of lawmaking effort connecting multiple iterations of a challenged law.
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between a newly enacted law and a prior improper purpose. It requires only
that we have a sensible process for analyzing these developments. As argued
throughout this Article, it is reasonable to place the burden on the state,
appearing back in court to defend a subsequent version of a law that was
previously invalidated, to explain how any potentially relevant developments
cleanse the taint.
The more difficult question is whether this is an appropriate burden for
the state to bear in all cases of second-bite lawmaking. If state actors are engaged
in good-faith interbranch dialogue, pursuing legitimate or even laudable goals
in an area where constitutional meaning is highly contested, why can they not
get close to the line? In other words, is all iterative lawmaking inherently bad?
If not, how do we distinguish between authentic recalibration and persistent
evasion? We explore these questions in the next section.
B.

Is Second-Bite Lawmaking Inherently Bad?

In trying to determine whether second-bite lawmaking is inherently
suspect, it is helpful to return to the series of ordinances passed by the District
of Columbia in an effort to regulate firearms within the city bounds. After its
initial effort was struck down by the Supreme Court in Heller I,369 the city tried
again. Its new effort to regulate firearms was again subjected to Second
Amendment challenge.370 While some portions of the new scheme were also
struck down, much of it was upheld, reflecting the city’s efforts to recalibrate
its regulations to comply with the demands of the Second Amendment.371 As
another example, consider the federal statute that at one time prohibited “the
depiction of animal cruelty.”372 After the Supreme Court struck down the
statute on overbreadth grounds in United States v. Stevens,373 Congress then

369. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (invalidating the district’s ban on handgun possession in
the home).
370. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
371. See id. at 1259–60, 1264 (upholding basic registration requirements and prohibitions on assault
weapons and high-capacity magazines and remanding with instructions for the district to provide
“meaningful evidence” in support of novel registration requirements and long gun registration
requirements). The district enacted a revised firearms act, repealing some of the challenged registration
provisions and retaining others. See Firearms Amendment Act of 2012, 59 D.C. Reg. 5691 (May 15,
2021) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 7-2502 (2013)). On review of the revised act, the appellate
court upheld basic registration for long guns, requirements that applicants appear in person to register
and provide fingerprints and a photograph, pay reasonable fees, and attend safety training. Heller III,
801 F.3d 264, 280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2015). However, it struck down triennial re-registration, physically
bringing the firearm, test of legal knowledge, and the prohibition on registration of “more than one
pistol per registrant during any 30–day period.” Id. at 281.
372. Depiction of Animal Cruelty, Pub. L. No. 106-152, 113 Stat. 1732 (1999) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 48).
373. 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (finding that the statute as written was “substantially overbroad,
and therefore invalid under the First Amendment”).
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“promptly revised and narrowed the statute.”374 The revised statute was upheld
against First Amendment challenges, and (for better or worse) is currently
enforced as part of the federal criminal code.375
For some readers, these examples of subsequent lawmaking are likely to
seem less problematic than the three case studies examined in detail above—
maybe even salutary. What should we make of this different reaction? How
does it impact the framework advanced here? There are several possible
answers. With regards to the statute struck down in Stevens, we could posit that
revision and reenactment is particularly sensible as a response to an overbreadth
ruling.376 As to the District of Columbia’s effort to regulate firearms, we might
observe that Second Amendment doctrine is new and its contours are still being
worked out, such that we might be less inclined to condemn lawmakers who
overstep its boundaries as having acted in some sort of deliberate defiance of
constitutional duty.377 We could also note that the legal analysis supplied by
Second Amendment doctrine does not invite consideration of improper
purpose, such that it is constitutionally irrelevant whether lawmakers retained
the same motive throughout multiple rounds of lawmaking and litigation.378
There is no taint to cleanse, so lawmakers can revise and redraft without
arousing suspicion of villainy.379
The important point is that iterative lawmaking itself is not necessarily
intrinsically good or bad, right or wrong. Lawmakers can go back to the drawing

374. United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2014).
375. Id. at 279 (“[18 U.S.C.] § 48 is limited to unprotected obscenity and therefore is facially
constitutional.”). See generally Justin Marceau, Palliative Animal Law: The War on Animal Cruelty, 134
HARV. L. REV. 250 (2021) (critiquing carceral animal law from an animal rights perspective). The
Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture (“PACT”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-72, 133 Stat. 1151 (2019)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 48)—which provided an additional update to the statute—was
passed with “overwhelming support” in both chambers. Matthew Daly, Congress Approves Bill Expanding
Animal Cruelty Law, AP NEWS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-animalcruelty-ted-deutch-vern-buchanan-crime-d6dab49a15af4f67875c17faddaccbbf [https://perma.cc/T8QR
-EZFT].
376. See Richards, 755 F.3d at 279 (explaining how Congress narrowed the second version of the
statute to exclude the provisions that had raised overbreadth concerns).
377. See Joseph Blocher, Response: Rights as Trumps of What?, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 120, 128–32
(2019).
378. Courts have so far developed and applied a doctrinal test that does not include an assessment
of motive, as this articulation demonstrates: “In determining whether some form of heightened scrutiny
applies, we consider two factors: ‘(1) “how close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment
right” and (2) “the severity of the law’s burden on the right.” Laws that neither implicate the core
protections of the Second Amendment nor substantially burden their exercise do not receive
heightened scrutiny.’” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 56 (2d Cir.
2018) (quoting N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 258 (2d Cir. 2015)), vacated
and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
379. Cf. William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 210–11 (2019) (“The
heroic story America tells itself about the Constitution . . . necessarily casts as villains the characters
who have ended up on the short side of the Supreme Court vote . . . .”).
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board in a posture that is reparative, defiant, evasive, or some combination. And
simply getting close to the line—seeking to exercise the maximum degree of
lawmaking power allowed by the relevant constitutional principles—is different
than evading constitutional principles by obscuring an ongoing improper
purpose.
Clarifying this core focus on the durability of improper purpose also helps
explain what appears to be a consistent ideological valence to all of the case
studies. Lawmaking efforts that burden Black voters, animal rights activists, and
migrants from predominantly Muslim countries all seem to pit progressive
interests against conservative lawmaking, which requires us to ask whether the
framework being developed here will have traction only for those whose
substantive ideological commitments align with the plaintiffs in these cases.
The answer is no, but a bit more explanation illuminates why this is so.
Over the course of our constitutional history, intent-based inquiries have
typically been used to curb majoritarian discrimination against “out” groups,
whose vigorous protection has been more strongly associated with progressive
ideology.380 These case studies exemplify that strand of rights litigation—
indeed, one of the important lessons of the North Carolina case study is the way
it fits into a longer trajectory of voter suppression efforts stretching back to the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. A framework for tracing improper
purpose through multiple rounds of lawmaking and litigation may well have
greater application to areas of contestation in which minoritized out-groups
wield constitutional principles as a bulwark against majoritarian processes. It
would be mistaken, however, to conclude that this will necessarily have a liberal
or progressive bent—it turns out that this itself is a principle with crossideological appeal if taken at a sufficient level of abstraction. Conservatives and
progressives do not disagree that there are embattled minorities who need
judicial protection from hostile majorities, they simply differ in their
identification of who counts as a minoritized out-group needing such
solicitude.381 The traceability paradigm has a cross-ideological reach because it

380. John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV.
451, 486–87 (1978); Eyer, Ideological Drift, supra note 31, at 66 (describing a period in the Supreme
Court’s history when intent doctrine was “used in the service of progressive racial justice aims”). But
see Professor Nikolas Bowie, Assistant Professor of L., Harvard L. Sch., Written Statement to the
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States: The Contemporary Debate over
Supreme Court Reform: Origins and Perspectives (June 30, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWF2-XSE4] (“[A]s a
matter of historical practice, the Court has wielded an antidemocratic influence on American law, one
that has undermined federal attempts to eliminate hierarchies of race, wealth, and status.”).
381. Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 941–43
(2004) (identifying various difficulties in discerning which religious groups are minorities).
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inherits the same ideological valence as the intent-based inquiries underlying it,
and the ideological valence of intent inquiries is constantly changing.382
This phenomenon has already been well documented with regards to
adjudication of race and gender discrimination under equal protection,383 but it
goes well beyond this realm into newer areas of contestation governed by newer
constitutional principles. Take the ag-gag cases, for example. To begin, we
might observe that support for these measures has been consistently bipartisan,
complicating the impulse to portray all of the lawmaking challenged in our case
studies as simply the product of Republican-controlled bodies. But more
importantly, the principles established in the ag-gag cases will protect
undercover investigators working in conservative social movements, like the
effort to recriminalize abortion. This ideological drift is already underway, as
exemplified by a recent suit brought by Planned Parenthood against the antiabortion activists who infiltrated the organization’s conferences and facilities
and recorded embarrassing statements made by the organization’s officials.384
Ruling on summary judgment motions, the district court was somewhat
parsimonious in crediting the defendants’ First Amendment defenses to the
imposition of damages arising from the publication of the videos.385 A group of
free speech scholars and animal advocacy groups that were instrumental in the
ag-gag litigation filed an amicus brief criticizing the district court for applying
common law trespass principles without adequate consideration of the free
speech interests at stake.386 Just as they had done in the ag-gag litigation, these
advocates urged the appellate court to recognize that “investigative deception

382. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869,
870 (1993) (explaining the concept of “ideological drift” by positing that “[s]tyles of legal argument,
theories of jurisprudence, and theories of constitutional interpretation do not have a fixed normative
or political valence” and that “[t]heir valence varies over time as they are applied and understood
repeatedly in new contexts and situations”); Eyer, Ideological Drift, supra note 31, at 7 (situating intent
doctrine in the phenomenon of ideological drift by which “doctrine may become unmoored from its
original normative underpinnings and may even come to serve opposing aims”).
383. Aviel, supra note 348, at 377 (“The kind of discrimination for which white claimants might
seek relief has been made highly salient and constitutionally significant. The kinds of injustice about
which claimants of color might complain are largely outside of Equal Protection’s reach.”).
384. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 402 F. Supp. 3d 615,
632–33 (N.D. Cal. 2019). For other cases in which free speech principles have been wielded in service
of anti-abortion movements, see, for example, Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) (invalidating required disclosures for crisis pregnancy centers whose aim is to
dissuade women from having abortions); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 473, 496–97 (2014)
(invalidating buffer zones around abortion clinics enacted in response to anti-abortion protestors).
385. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 402 F. Supp. 3d at 644–45.
386. Brief of Amici Curiae for Free Speech Scholars and Animal-Advocacy Organizations in
Support of Neither Party at 16, Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, No. 16cv-236-WHO (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2021) (Nos. 20-16068, 20-16070, 20-16773 & 20-16820), 2021 WL
964262, at *16.
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is protected speech” that cannot be categorically punished without careful
attention to whether the harms alleged are legally cognizable.387
It is worth noting that this example of cross-ideological reach arises in a
damages suit brought against private parties rather than a challenge to
lawmaking of any kind, much less the successive variety. But the speech-chilling
potential of private tort lawsuits has been clear since at least New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,388 and the example helps illustrate that if the California state
legislature attempted repeatedly to prohibit whistleblowing and undercover
investigations in certain medical facilities in an effort to protect abortion
providers from negative publicity, the persistence of a speech-suppressing
intent would be as central to the question of constitutional validity as it has
been in the ag-gag cases. The ag-gag case study is thus only superficially a story
about progressive interest groups using constitutional principles to impede a
conservative legislative agenda.
It should be even easier to see the cross-ideological effects of a robust
traceability scheme in religious liberty litigation.389 Intent inquiries can be
pivotal to religious liberty litigation,390 and indeed, the presence of “religious
animus” was central to the ruling in favor of the Christian baker who refused to
387. Id. at *2, *17.
388. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
389. There has been a pronounced effort on the part of both scholars and advocacy groups to
demonstrate that the doctrine protects marginalized religious minorities and thereby continues to serve
an important check on majoritarian power. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty brings cases on
behalf of Sikhs, Muslims, Native Americans, Jews, Catholics, and Protestant Christians from various
denominations and prominently displays this diversity on its website. See Becket Case Database,
BECKET, https://www.becketlaw.org/cases/ [https://perma.cc/QFP3-36KT]. Scholars have attempted
to show empirically that “[r]eligious minorities remain significantly overrepresented in religious
freedom cases; Christians remain significantly underrepresented.” Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N.
Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 353, 353 (2018). It is not clear how the study might control for the fact that religious
practices associated with majoritarian Christian denominations are less likely to be burdened by neutral,
generally applicable laws, and other scholars are much less sanguine about the extent to which religious
minorities continue to find robust protection in current religious liberty jurisprudence. See Cathleen
Kaveny, The Ironies of the New Religious Liberty Litigation, DAEDALUS, Summer 2020, at 72, 72; see also
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, 104 MINN.
L. REV. 1341, 1402–04 (2020) (expressing concern about “rising Christian favoritism” in religious
liberty jurisprudence).
390. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523, 540 (1993)
(explaining that “[t]he principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or
practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions” and striking down
animal cruelty ordinances that “had as their object the suppression of religion”); see also Douglas
Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV.
1, 8 (2016) (asserting that “[a]nti-religious motive is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, but it is not
necessary,” and explaining that only two Justices joined the section of the opinion resting on antireligious
motive); Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 199, at 135 (“[U]nder the Free Exercise Clause, acts
motivated by religious animus are, at least as a prima facie matter, impermissible.”); Schragger &
Schwartzman, supra note 389, at 1397–405.
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make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.391 To be sure, the cross-ideological
potential of a vigorous scheme for tracing religious hostility has been obscured
by the lack of vocal support expressed by religious conservatives for the
plaintiffs in the travel ban cases.392 Problems of selective application aside,
however, religious discrimination is ostensibly a phenomenon of deep concern
to both conservatives and progressives.393 Whether an observer is more inclined
to see religious animus in the statements of the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission or President Trump, in either case, she should be invested in a
regime that keeps track of it across multiple iterations.394
The idea of improper purpose as an invalidating force is so popular that it
is spreading to the Second Amendment context, where there is a movement
afoot to introduce motive scrutiny into the assessment of firearm regulation.395
In challenging these regulations as violative of the Second Amendment, gun
rights advocates assert “that support for gun regulation is motivated by antigun bias.”396 Professor Joseph Blocher explains how Second Amendment
litigants attempt to cast their claims as targeting “the kind of government
bigotry, intolerance, or corruption” that other constitutional doctrines treat as
suspect.397
In sum, anyone who believes that an improper purpose can render a law
or official decision constitutionally invalid—and these days that seems to be
pretty much everyone—ought to embrace a framework that is capable of
391. See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 199
(2018) [hereinafter Berg, Religious Freedom] (discussing “evidence of anti-religious hostility in
Masterpiece”); see also Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?, 2017
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 139–40. For critique of the animus holding in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
especially when viewed in light of the contrary ruling in Trump v. Hawaii, see, for example, Schragger
& Schwartzman, supra note 389, at 1399–405 (arguing that animus has lost meaning due to selective
application); Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the New Minorities, 2018 SUP.
CT. REV. 257, 281 (asserting that Masterpiece Cakeshop’s ruling shows “that the concept of animus may
be applied flexibly—and indeed, inverted”).
392. See Berg, Religious Freedom, supra note 391, at 184 (identifying and critiquing the failure of
religious conservatives to defend Muslim religious freedom as “a serious error—of pragmatics and of
principle”).
393. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 389, at 1404 (“[A]nimus seems to be in the eye of
the beholder. It is notable that a doctrine that has generally applied to ethnic, racial, sexual, and
religious minorities—African-Americans and Muslims and other traditionally despised religious
groups—is deployed by the Court to protect religious conservatives against a state enforcing a liberal
norm of equal treatment.”).
394. Conversely, the traceability paradigm cannot and does not purport to solve the problem of
selective application.
395. See Blocher, supra note 377, at 126–27.
396. Id. at 129; see also Darrel A.H. Miller, The Second Amendment and Second-Class Rights, HARV.
L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-second-amendment-and-secondclass-rights/ [https://perma.cc/B7J6-BW5L].
397. Blocher, supra note 377, at 131 (noting that the briefing for the challengers in one prominent
case attacking New York City’s regulatory scheme insists that “[t]he City betrays [in this law and in
the litigation] its hostility to Second Amendment rights”).
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tracking any such lingering purpose through multiple rounds of lawmaking and
litigation. For all its challenges and shortcomings, motive scrutiny is a basic
feature of constitutional law, and it can serve to advance interests that align
with either conservative or progressive ideals.398 This project takes that
landscape as a given and builds upon it a framework tailored to the specific
context of successive lawmaking. The framework gives effect to the insights
gleaned through careful analysis of our illustrative case studies: that
“discriminatory intent tends to linger”; that after multiple rounds of lawmaking
and litigation it is likely to be driven underground rather than forthrightly
expressed; and that this phenomenon requires procedural mechanisms tailored
to this particular context.
CONCLUSION
The case studies explored in this Article are important in their own right,
each portraying a vivid site of contemporary constitutional struggle, but
together, they serve to illustrate a much broader and trans-substantive
phenomenon. These case studies show that it is often possible to trace a singular
trajectory of lawmaking effort across multiple cycles of invalidation, revision,
and subsequent litigation. This Article shows not only that it is possible to
understand second-bite lawmaking in this holistic, continuous, and historically
grounded way, but that doing so is essential. As the case studies reveal,
constitutional litigation is information forcing in a way that works to the benefit
of government defendants determined to stay the course. Because these officials
benefit from the lessons learned in their previous efforts, a court’s willingness
to see the connection between an earlier effort and a subsequent iteration
eventually becomes outcome determinative as government defendants learn to
conceal the defects that were fatal to prior versions.
Tracing impermissible intent through multiple rounds of lawmaking and
litigation is consistent with longstanding elements of the Supreme Court’s
methodology in such matters, and its availability as a procedural principle
should be strengthened rather than undermined. A full course correction would
revitalize the earlier principle that government defendants returning to court to
defend second-bite lawmaking bear the burden to prove that the impermissible
intent has indeed vanished, especially given the significant obstacles that
plaintiffs face in making the initial demonstration of impermissible intent. As
scholars have long recognized, the Supreme Court’s intent doctrine “permits
policymakers to conceal invidious purposes behind facially neutral language.”399
398. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 199, at 134 (describing animus as “a basic principle of
constitutional law, namely, that officials act illegitimately when their conduct is based on wrongful
intentions”).
399. Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and Constitutional Rights, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 2147, 2149 (2019).
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But at the very least, the Court should adhere to its previous insight that “the
world is not made brand new every morning,”400 and recognize that it is in
tension with the idea of a presumption that refreshes in full no matter how
many times the state may attempt to refashion its prior work product into
something more likely to withstand scrutiny. To treat the presumption of
legislative good faith as an infinitely renewable resource is to undermine the
substantive constitutional principles underlying these multiphased disputes.

400. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005).
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